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The sharing of information across government intra- and inter-agencies provides enormous 
benefits to Intelligence operations, but it also poses risks to Intelligence organizations’ 
operational capability.  These benefits and risks of sharing information within Intelligence 
Communities introduce a paradox that disturbs decision-making abilities and affect existing and 
future relationships with local and national Intelligence partners. With this paradox, there exist 
particular forces that affect the paradox, such as organizational factors and the behavior of an 
information sharer, the responsible actor that decides on how, when and with whom to share the 
information.  Combining the two can produce a positive (desired) outcome that leads to 
successful mission accomplishment or negative (inadvertent) outcome that leads to loss of 
information disclosed or intentional loss of valuable information.  An inadvertent outcome could 
result in an impact to the national defense of the United States. Do Intelligence Analysts share 
information when the risks outweigh the benefits?  This research examines how understanding 
the paradox of information sharing is a critical element in understanding the behavior of 
Intelligence Analysts’ decision-making in Intelligence operations.
  
v 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
CHAPTER 1:   INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................ 1 
 1.1      RESEARCH DOMAIN ............................................................................................ 1 
 1.2       RESEARCH PERSPECTIVE ...................................................................................... 9 
 1.3     RESEARCH APPROACH ......................................................................................... 12 
 1.4  SUMMARY……  ...................................................................................................... 16 
CHAPTER 2:   LITERATURE REVIEW ............................................................................... 19 
 2.1  INFORMATION  ...................................................................................................... 19 
 2.2  PARADOXES….  ...................................................................................................... 20 
 2.3  INFO SHARING PARADOX .................................................................................... 22 
 2.4  GOVERNMENT INTER- AND INTRA-AGENCY INFO SHARING .................... 27 
 2.5 INTER- AND INTRA-AGENCY INFO SHARING BENEFITS, RISK AND 
BARRIERS…….  ...................................................................................................... 31 
CHAPTER 3: THEORY OF PLANNED BEHAVIOR ......................................................... 39 
 3.1  KEY CONSTRUCTS OF THEORY OF PLANNED BEHAVIOR .......................... 39 
 3.2  APPLICATIONS OF THEORY OF PLANNED BEHAVIOR ................................. 39 
 3.3  THEORY OF PLANNED BEHAVIOR AND DECISION-MAKING ..................... 41 
CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH DESIGN .................................................................................... 45 
 4.1  SUBJECTS……..  ...................................................................................................... 45 
 4.2  INFORMATION THEORY ADAPTATION ............................................................ 48 
 4.3   RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ............................................................................... 58 
   4.3.1  DATA COLLECTION ..................................................................................... 59 
   4.3.2 DATA ANALYSIS METHOD ......................................................................... 60 
CHAPTER 5: DATA ANALYSIS ......................................................................................... 65 
 5.1  RESULTS……… ...................................................................................................... 65 
   5.1.1 RESULTS DATA ANALYSIS ......................................................................... 70 
CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION ................................................................................................. 75 
     6.1  INTUITION……. ...................................................................................................... 76 
   6.1.1 RELATIONSHIPS AND BELIEFS .................................................................. 76 
CHAPTER 7: CONTRIBUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS .................................................... 83 
  
vi 
 
vi [Type a quote from the document or 
the summary of an interesting point. 
You can position the text box 
anywhere in the document. Use the 
Drawing Tools tab to change the 
formatting of the pull quote text box.] 
 7.1  CONTRIBUTIONS .................................................................................................... 83 
 7.2   LIMITATIONS  ...................................................................................................... 94 
   7.2.1 GENERALIZABILITY ..................................................................................... 96 
   7.2.2 VARIANCE ...................................................................................................... 96 
 7.3   CONCLUSION  ...................................................................................................... 97 
CHAPTER 8:  APPENDICES ................................................................................................ 99 
APPENDIX A:  THEORY OF PLANNED BEHAVIOR AND INFORMATION 
SHARING PARADOX CONSTRUCTS ................................................................... 99 
   APPENDIX B:  INTERVIEW GUIDE .................................................................... 101 
CHAPTER 9:    REFERENCES ............................................................................................. 102 
  
 vii 
LIST OF TABLES  
Table 1 Categories of Benefits, Risks, and Barriers (Dawes, 1996)............................................. 28 
Table 2 Info Sharing Decision ...................................................................................................... 66 
Table 3 Info Sharing Reasons ....................................................................................................... 74 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
viii 
 
viii [Type a quote from the document or 
the summary of an interesting point. 
You can position the text box 
anywhere in the document. Use the 
Drawing Tools tab to change the 
formatting of the pull quote text box.] 
 
LIST OF FIGURES  
 
Figure 1 Factors Influencing Organization Info Sharing (Yang and Maxwell, 2011).................. 34 
Figure 2 Theory of Planned Behavior (Ajzen and Fishbien, 1973) .............................................. 44 
Figure 3 Conceptual Framework .................................................................................................. 49 
 
 
 
  
ix 
 
ABBREVIATIONS 
List of Abbreviations (in Alphabetical Order) 
CIA……...…..Central Intelligence Agency 
DIA………….Defense Intelligence Agency 
DNI………….Director of National Intelligence 
DoD…………Department of Defense 
FBI…………..Federal Bureau of Investigations 
IC……………Intelligence Community 
ICD………….Intelligence Community Directive  
IED………….Improvised Explosive Device 
Info Share…...Information Sharing or Info Sharing 
IA…………...Intelligence Analysts 
IS…………....Information Security 
IS(s)…………Information Systems 
IT……………Information Technology 
JDAM……….Joint Direct Attack Munitions  
PEOU……….Perceived Ease of Use 
PU………...... Perceived Usefulness 
PWM……….. Prototype-Willingness Model 
NGA………..  National Geospatial Agency 
NRO………..  National Reconnaissance Office 
NSA………... National Security Agency 
ODNI………. Office of Director of National Intelligence 
TPB………… Theory of Planned Behavior 
TRA………... Theory of Reasoned Action 
UCMJ………. Uniform Code of Military Justice 
 
 
 
 
  
x 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
The sharing of information across government intra- and inter-agencies provides enormous 
benefits to Intelligence operations, but it also poses risks to Intelligence organizations’ 
operational capability.  These benefits and risks of sharing information within Intelligence 
Communities introduce a paradox that disturbs decision-making abilities and affect existing and 
future relationships with local and national Intelligence partners. With this paradox, there exist 
particular forces that affect the paradox, such as organizational factors and the behavior of an 
information sharer, the responsible actor that decides on how, when and with whom to share the 
information.  Combining the two can produce a positive (desired) outcome that leads to 
successful mission accomplishment or negative (inadvertent) outcome that leads to loss of 
information disclosed or intentional loss of valuable information.  An inadvertent outcome could 
result in an impact to the national defense of the United States. Do Intelligence Analysts share 
information when the risks outweigh the benefits?  This research examines how understanding 
the paradox of information sharing is a critical element in understanding the behavior of 
Intelligence Analysts’ decision-making in Intelligence operations.  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1  Research Domain 
This research study investigates the paradox of information (info) sharing.  First, there 
are two important definitions regarding info sharing: non-electronic and electronic info sharing.  
Javernpaa and Staples (2000) define non-electronic info sharing as the volitional conveyance of 
information generated or obtained by one entity to another entity, whereas electronic info sharing 
occurs via computing and communication technologies.  In addition, there are competing 
definitions and different ways to understand government info sharing and integration.  Ramon 
Gil-Garcia, Soon Ae, and Janssen (2009) define information integration as “the forming of a 
large unit of organization entities, temporary or permanent, for the purpose of merging processes 
or sharing information” (p. 2).   Within the literature, there are definitions that highlight the 
social and political nature, while other definitions focus more attention on info sharing and 
integration from technical aspects.  Davenport and Prusak (1997), Pardo, Cresswell, Thompson, 
and Zhang (2006), Richardson and Asthana (2006), and Benjamin, Rockart, Morton, and Wyman 
(1984) suggest that research that highlights the social aspects of government integration focuses 
on info sharing, inter-agency collaboration, and coordination mechanisms.  In contrast, research 
that deals with the technical aspects focuses on topics such as interoperability and the integration 
of data by means of various technologies, including standards-based document sharing, 
middleware applications, data warehouses, and consolidated information systems (Dawes, 1996; 
Larence, 2008; Lips, O'Neill, & Eppel, 2011; Luo, Zhang, & Leung, 2001; Miranda, 2003).   The 
focus of this research study is towards the social aspects of government integration focusing on 
info sharing, inter-agency and intra-agency collaboration, coordination mechanisms, and the 
behavior of information technology users.  An example of Gil-Garcia et al.’s (2009) definition of 
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integration and info sharing is the 2004 U.S. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act 
(IRTPA).  The IRTPA authorized the president to create an Info Sharing Environment (ISE) for 
the sharing of terrorism information in a manner consistent with national security and with 
applicable legal standards relating to privacy and civil liberties.  The plan of the ISE highlights 
sharing of terrorism prevention-related information among all ISE participants, in the forms of 
federal-to-state, state-to-state, state-to-locality, government-to-industry, and even federal 
government-to-foreign ally.  
Next, since this research investigates the paradox of info sharing, it is important to 
understand and explain the meaning of paradox.  Leaders in inter- and intra-agency 
organizations, including the military, are given responsibilities to increase efficiency, reduce 
budgets, foster innovation, and build teams for creativity, and are expected to think globally and, 
at the same time, to think locally. It has become common to suggest these types of everyday 
responsibilities are paradoxical in nature and it has become a cliché to managers and leaders.  
Handy (1994) argues that paradox is both overused and underspecified; thus, simply labeling 
something as a paradox does not necessarily advance the understanding of it. On the other hand, 
other researchers often avoid defining paradox altogether (e.g., Westenholz (1993), which does 
not advance the comprehension of paradox either. Although the term paradox provokes 
numerous and various meanings, Hampden-Turner (1981) and Schneider (1990) suggest that it 
begins with philosophers from the ancient Greeks to Existentialists who have viewed human 
existence as paradoxical with the understanding of its position in tensions between life and death, 
good and evil, self and other.  Equally, psychologists have long stressed the cognitive nature of 
paradox, examining its impacts of tensions on creativity and mental health or using paradoxical 
therapy to help actors face their inner conflicts (Bateson, 1972; Harris, 1996; Rothenberg, 1979; 
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Wartzawick, Weakland, & Fisch, 1974).   In organizational studies, researchers have defined 
paradox as contradictions embedded within a statement, human emotions, or organizational 
practices (Eisenhardt & Westcott, 1988; Murnighan & Conlon, 1991; Vince & Broussine, 1996).  
Conversely, others describe paradox as an observation that counters common beliefs or as an 
unintended consequence (Davis, Maranville, & Oblog, 1997; Sitkin & Bies, 1993).  The 
approach of this research study is from the perspective of Koot, Sabelis, and Ybema (1996),  
which argues for using the notion of one of the great philosophers, Ludwig Wittgenstein, which 
suggests paradox as something surprising.  In addition, the most useful definition is from Quinn 
and Cameron (1988), authors of one of the leading books in the field of paradoxes; to wit, 
“embracing clashing ideas, paradox . . . involves contradictory, mutually exclusive elements that 
are present and operate equally at the same time.”  They argued the importance of understanding 
the complexity, diversity, and ambiguity of organizational life and highlighted the insightfulness 
paradox offers the potentially powerful framework for examining the impacts of plurality and 
change, adding understanding of divergent perspectives and disruptive experiences. Therefore, 
the paradoxical view of this research is from Quinn and Cameron (1988) definition combined 
with Ford and Backoff (1988) perspective, which defines paradox as some thing that denotes a 
wide variety of contradictory, yet interwoven elements; i.e., perspectives, feelings, messages, 
demands, identities, interests, or practices.  The paradox construct is between the benefits and 
risks in sharing information which is influence by two organizational factors: security policies 
and info sharing policies and Intelligence Analysts’ (IA) behaviors: attitude and intuition, as 
actors attempting to make sense of an increasingly intricate, ambiguous, and ever-changing IT 
world.  The paradox becomes apparent through the self or social reflection or interaction that 
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reveals the seemingly absurd and irrational coexistence of the actual benefits and inherent risks 
to info sharing.             
In adopting the social aspect of info sharing, this research focuses on Information 
Technology (IT) users of electronic info sharing that occurs via computing and communication 
technologies.  These particular IT users are both IA who have access to electronic information 
and decision-makers when using communication technologies and deciding to share information.  
Every day this unique group of IT users confronts the paradox: a mystery or consummate blend 
of opposites on the systems they use to communicate with one another.  This paradox becomes 
apparent in the info sharing decision based on the IA knowledge of the organization’s security 
and info sharing policies and the conflict that exists within them because of their personal 
behavior, attitude and intuition, and their subjective normative beliefs.  They must internally 
analyze the benefit versus risk tradeoff propositions, which are impacted by the organization’s 
security and info sharing policies and the individual’s beliefs, typically influenced by an actor’s 
background factors that influence his/her behavior intention.  One key factor to understand 
within the paradox of info sharing in the organization is the inherent risk taker, not the 
individual.  The organization position would always assume the optimum cost-benefit analysis, 
but the decision-maker, the IA, does not necessarily have all the information and can’t possible 
consider all the variables in a cost-benefit analysis, which may very well conflict with the 
organization’s security and info sharing policies.  Would the government consciously hire risky 
IA to share Intelligence data?  We know that technology systems drive policy every bit as much 
as policy drives technology systems.  Policy and technology face paradoxes specifically where 
policymakers appear to be comfortable with paradoxical situations, and even reap value from its 
existence, because paradox can provide decision-makers critical wiggle room (John, Boardman, 
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& Sauser, 2008).  On the other hand, technology developers prefer less ambiguity and more 
clear-cut specifications.  John et al. (2008), suggest that the IT users’ preference for 
unambiguous languages, like mathematics, desire for encyclopedic knowledge of prioritized 
requirements, and occasional reluctance to buck the engineering community’s “conventional 
wisdom” limits the IT users’ problem-solving approaches.  Thus, there is conflict in the IT users’ 
decision-making when sharing information from an organizational versus an individual behavior 
perspective.  
Finally, in the info sharing domain, it is clear that, for an info sharing entity to survive, it 
must develop and maintain long-term relationships with the entities it decides to share with in the 
relationship.  To this end, for the Intelligence Community (IC) to survive, it also depends on vast 
quantities of information to build rapport with each other that attracts the attention of national 
partners.  Info sharing among government agencies gained considerable attention in the 
aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks, Hurricane Katrina, and mass shooting rampages, 
such as the one involving Fort Hood gunman Nidal Hassan who killed 13 people on a U.S. 
military post.  Feldman-Stewart et al. (2007) argued that there was “near universal agreement” 
that fighting terror would require deeper data exchanges than ever existed before between inter- 
and intra-agencies, including our military forces.  The improvement of info sharing among 
government agencies has become one of the highest priorities of decision-makers, and the lack of 
info sharing has been identified as a major point of failure leading to and responding to these 
horrific events (Akbulut-Bailey, 2011).   
Today, many international and U.S. political leaders place great emphasis on the purpose 
of national and foreign policies that should establish a systematic bias in favor of much more 
info sharing.  The ability to collect, analyze, and respond to user information is of growing 
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importance (Awad & Krishnan, 2006).  One of the objectives of the IC is to be an integrated 
network of agencies that work together to protect our nation’s defense.  To this end, the 
Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) Number 501, addresses the mandates in the IRTPA of 
2004 to strengthen the sharing, integration, and management of information within the IC, and 
establishes policies for discovery, dissemination or retrieval of intelligence, and intelligence-
related information collected or analysis produced by the IC.  The objective of ICD 501 is 
threefold: 1) to foster an enduring culture of responsible sharing and collaboration with an 
integrated IC; 2) to provide an improved capacity to warn of and disrupt risks to the U.S. 
homeland, and U.S. persons and interests; and 3) to provide more accurate, timely, and insightful 
analysis to inform decision-making by the president, senior military commanders, national 
security advisers, and other executive branch officials.  Sharing information across inter-
agencies, like foreign national partners, or intra-agencies, like the IC, is usually presented by the 
potential gains that government agencies could obtain from their participation in the inter- or 
intra-agency information exchange initiative.  Some examples are to detect national security 
threats around the world, increasing government transparency and accountability; reducing costs 
and duplication; a more efficient agency or governmental organization; and improved decision-
making for government officials and public servants.  According to (Dawes, 1996), government 
info sharing offers a real opportunity to share databases and make sharper decisions based on 
more information that is complete. 
Although there are number of potential benefits to sharing information, there are perhaps 
an equal number of challenges, barriers, and risks not to share information; thus, a paradox 
exists.   The reasons not to share information, as highlighted within the literature, begin with the 
complex integration and flow along a contour of difficult tasks facing a myriad of political, 
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organizational, legal, and technical challenges (Gil-Garcia et al. (2009); Gil-Garcia, Chengalur-
Smith, and Duchessi (2007); (Luna-Reyes & Gil-Garcia, 2003; Luna-Reyes, Gil-Garcia, & Cruz, 
2007).  This may include lack of political support, lack of financial resources, individual privacy, 
confidentiality, and secrecy concerns; WikiLeaks’ and Live Leaks’ release of damaging 
information inadvertently or intentionally; and poor technical skills. Given the benefits and 
challenges, this research suggests a gap exists which ends with a challenge not addressed by 
using the technologies and other processes that creates the current paradox.  This research 
conjectures that the info sharing decisions of highly skilled or smart info sharers would reflect 
superior decisions on the information to share, while the decisions of relatively less skilled or 
risky info sharers are more likely to be induced by behavioral biases.  This inference is motivated 
by recent research in behavioral economics (Frederick (2005); Benjamin, Brown, and Shapiro 
(2013); and Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, and Sunde (2010)), which finds that lower levels of 
smartness are associated with more anomalous preferences and stronger emotional behavioral 
biases.  The studies show that smart individuals exhibit lower levels of risk aversion and greater 
patience (Korniotis & Kumar, 2011).   
    Within the literature, the fact that information has value in terms of monetary 
importance is well known, and there are several information models to measure it; however, one 
of the non-financial values of information where the preconception is not necessarily 
straightforward for information is the value of power (Ahituv & Carmi, 2007).  According to 
Ahituv and Carmi (2007), the relationship between information and power in inter- or intra-
agencies can pertain to many issues that senior officials are challenged with, such as knowledge 
management and info sharing.  Specifically, the implication of these issues that senior officials 
face today, Ahituv and Carmi (2007) argue, on one hand, is a driver of change in the distribution 
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of power within the agency due to a change in the information distribution. However, on the 
other hand, the introduction of these issues is a process that involves interested parties 
intentionally using their power, deriving partly from the information they have, to affect the 
nature of the agency and to obtain more power by obtaining more information.  To this end, 
Ahituv and Carmi (2007) postulate that this effect exists because there is a positive connection 
between information and power.   
Moreover, there are strong political pressures on inter- and intra-agencies to engage in 
info sharing; however, in practical application, how consistently this is done really depends on 
our foreign partners’ discretion as well as our inter-agencies’ application of the Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) policies.  There is plenty of guidance within the IC on 
info sharing; in fact, each agency has its own policies and supplements to national policies on 
whether information should be shared, and, if so, what information, to whom, and to some 
extent, the information shared is decided on a case-by-case basis. Our national partners also have 
their own info sharing policies on what information should be shared, most importantly, with 
whom, and may also decide to share, based on their nation’s interest, on a case-by-case basis.  
Another concern for the IC’s mission in national defense is sharing of information that may lead 
to classified information being mistakenly shared, resulting in information leakage, intentionally 
or unintentionally.  Intentional information leakage may be the result of espionage.  On the other 
hand, unintentional informational leakage can occur from inferences.  Inferences occur when 
extrapolated classified information is from different sources of unclassified shared information. 
Inferences exist because of the inherent engineering relationships between different pieces of 
information and have a major impact on national defense. One inference that is occurring more 
frequently today is espionage.  Espionage occurs because of the power of information.  
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1.2  Research Perspective 
This study will use the adaptation of the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) which is an 
extension of Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) (Ajzen, 2011, 2012; Fishbein & Ajzen, 2005) to 
inform this research in capturing the paradox in the info sharing decision of an IA analysis of the 
risks and benefits influenced by the organization’s security and info sharing policies as well as 
his/her attitude and intuition.  Although IA navigate the paradox of the benefits and risks in 
sharing information, the influences as mentioned, impacts the decision to share on not share 
information.  These influences result in factors that drive behavior intentions of IA.  An 
intriguing factor is that an IA’s attitude and intuition may conflict with the organization’s 
security and info sharing policies.  Adaptation of the TPB to inform this research allows 
examination and further understanding of the process of IA behavior that deals with the relations 
among beliefs (attitudes and intuitions) and the intentions of sharing decisions.  Perceived 
Behavioral Control (PBC) is added as a construct to TPB to solve the problem of explaining 
behaviors in which the actor does not have full volitional control (Fen & Sabaruddin, 2008).  
TPB, when applied to a wide range of behaviors in order to understand why individuals behave 
in a certain way, is one of the best-supported social psychological theories with respect to 
predicting human behavior (Sommer, 2011).  According to (Smith, Manstead, Terry, & Louis, 
2007), the central premise is that behavioral decisions are the result of a reasoned process in 
which the behavior is influenced by attitudes, norms, and perceived behavior control.  With roots 
in a social psychological approach to behavior, TPB and TRA postulate that changing behavior 
is a matter of changing the cognitive structure underlying the behavior in question.  The theories 
are a series of four hypotheses.  The first hypothesis relates to behavior assumed primarily to be 
a function of an individual’s intention to perform that behavior.  The second hypothesis relates to 
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the intention to perform the behavior as a function of the weighted combination of two factors; a 
personal factor that is the attitude toward the behavior and a social factor that is the subjective 
norm.  Thus, in this hypothesis, the attitude toward the behavior is the feeling of favorableness 
toward the behavior and the subjective norm suggests the perception that people of importance 
think that the individual should or should not perform the behavior. The third hypothesis 
suggests that underlying the attitude toward the behavior is an underlying cognitive structure of 
behavioral beliefs that performing the behavior will lead to certain outcomes and the evaluation 
of these outcomes.   Finally, the last hypothesis suggests the subjective norm is an underlying 
cognitive structure of normative beliefs that particular individuals or groups think that one 
should or should not perform the behavior and the individual’s motivation to comply with each 
of these significant others.    
In using information for decision-making, the information processing perspective argues 
that individuals make decision based on the amount of information available to them and the 
effort they expend to arrive at their decisions. It is impossible to imagine that every IA will have 
all information available on a topic or complete understanding of the organization’s behavior 
when deciding to share information with a given entity.  Some researchers (Bettman, 1979; 
Bettman & Park, 1980) argue that individual decision-making strategies vary on a continuum 
from being completely rational normative to purely heuristic.  This suggests that, where all the 
necessary information and resources are available, an individual makes a rational-normative 
decision for arriving at an accurate optimal decision.  Conversely, in the situations where the 
context is novel and the information available is limited, individuals resort to heuristic decision-
making style, through which they draw generalizations and projections to arrive at an appropriate 
decision, which minimizes perceived cognitive burden and risk (Bettman & Park, 1980).  
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Therefore, to understand an individual’s behavior in info sharing decision-making, and perhaps 
to help the practitioners more successfully manage ways to identify, seek, assess, use and share 
information, the research will endeavor to answer the question: How do IA navigate the paradox 
between the benefits and risks affected by individual behaviors and organization factors that 
inhibit info sharing decisions? 
The adaptation of the TPB is used to inform this research study in analyzing an 
individual’s behavior intention in making the decision to share information with others, either 
within the government inter- or intra-agency organizations or publicly with other individuals.  
However, the research study will also use an exploratory approach from a grounded theory 
perspective.  Charmaz (2010) argues this approach and method bring surprises, spark ideas, and 
foster seeing data in fresh ways and exploring ideas about the data through early analytic writing. 
It also offers flexible guidelines for collecting and analyzing qualitative data to construct theories 
grounded in the data themselves (Charmaz, 2010, p. 2).   Thus, the data form the foundation of 
the theory and the analysis of the data generates the concepts that are constructed.  In this 
approach, one attends to what he/she hears, sees, and senses during the interview.  Using this 
approach, this research will take a constructivist approach to the exploratory study.   Charmaz 
(2010) also argues a constructivist approach places priority on the phenomena of study and sees 
both data and analysis as created from shared experiences and relationships with participants and 
other sources of data.  A critical element in the constructivist approach is that it studies the how 
and sometimes the why participants may construct meaning and actions in specific situations.  
Moreover, Charmaz (2010) argues constructivist grounded theorists take a reflexive stance 
toward the research process and products and consider how their theories evolve, from which she 
postulates that both researchers and research participants interpret meanings and actions.  The 
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justification for building a theory as opposed to only using existing theory, Bartunek, Rynes, and 
Ireland (2006) argue for research that builds theory from cases are often regarded as the “most 
interesting” research and are among the most highly cited pieces in the Academy of Management 
Journal, with impact disproportionate to their numbers (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007).  With the 
understanding that sound empirical research begins with strong grounding in related literature, 
which identifies a research gap and proposes research questions that address the gap, theory 
building from cases requires researchers to take an added step of justifying why theory building 
rather than theory-testing better addresses the research question.  The critical point to the 
justification in building theory in this study is to convince readers that the research question is 
crucial for organizations and/or theory, and demonstrate that the existing research either does not 
address the research question at all, or does so in a way that is inadequate or likely to be untrue 
(Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007).   
1.3  Research Approach 
Using an exploratory approach from a grounded theory perspective and employing the 
constructivist grounded theorist perspective allows for a set of principles and practices, not as 
prescriptions or packages, but emphasizes flexible guidelines, according to Charmaz (2010).  
Therefore, it is also important to understand additional approaches, methodological rules, 
recipes, and requirements to dealing with the how and how questions in research studies.  (Van 
de Ven, 2007a) suggests there are two basic epistemologies that underlie the different approaches 
that are necessary to study research questions dealing with what and how.  Bruner (1986), p. 
147), distinguished them as representing two basic types of human intelligence: the 
paradigmatic, logical-scientific (variance) mode of thought and the narrative (process) mode of 
thought.  He describes them as follows:  
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There are two modes of cognitive functioning, two modes of 
thought, each providing distinctive ways of ordering experience, of 
constructing reality.  The two (though complimentary) are 
irreducible to one another…. Each of the ways of knowing, 
moreover, has operating principles of its own and its own criteria of 
well-formedness.  They differ radically in their procedures for 
verification. (Bruner, 1986: 11) 
 
Bruner highlights that we have relatively little knowledge about how narrative understanding 
works compared to the vast literature on paradigmatic thinking and its methods.  Although recent 
research in many fields is filling this void, much remains to be done.  Aldrich (2001) 
distinguishes the what and how questions in terms of outcome-driven and event-driven research, 
as follows: 
Outcome-driven explanations are built backward, from an awareness 
of observed outcomes to prior casually significant events.  Two 
related problems are introduced with this strategy.  First, it often 
leads to investigators’ selecting on the dependent variable, a well-
known research bias.  Second, even though we might include all 
organizations—those that have experienced the event and those that 
have not—we still observed them at only one point in time (Aldrich 
2001: 118).  Conversely, event driven explanations are built forward, 
from observed or recorded events to outcomes. (Aldrich 2001: 118). 
 
 Aldrich (2001) notes that researchers often run into trouble by not making explicit 
distinctions between event-driven and outcome-driven studies of organizational and other social 
processes.  His argument is based on two different definitions of process used within the 
literature: 1) a category of concepts or variables that pertain to actions and 2) activities and a 
narrative describing how things develop and change (Van de Ven, 1992).  The research question 
of this study is: How do IA navigate the paradox between the benefits and risks affected by 
individual behaviors and organizations factors that inhibit info sharing decisions?  While the 
research question could fall in the category of the second definition, which typically takes an 
event-driven approach that is often associated with a process study of the temporal sequence of 
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events (Abbott, 1988; Pentland, 1999; Poole, 1983; Tsoukas, 2005), this study will use the first 
definition, which is associated with a variance model with an outcome driven explanation.  
According to Mohr (1982), when the first definition is used, process is typically associated with 
a variance model where an outcome-driven explanation examines the degree to which a set of 
independent variables statistically explain variations in some outcome criteria (dependent 
variables).  
Mohr (1982) and Poole (1983) distinguished variance and process approaches to social 
scientific research.  A variance model explains change in terms of relationships among 
independent variables and dependent variables, while a process model explains how a sequence 
of events leads to some outcome.  The common thread running through both works is the 
difference between scientific explanations cast in terms of independent variables causing 
changes in a dependent variable, and explanations that tell a narrative or story about how a 
sequence of events unfolds to produce a given outcome.  In this particular study, the variance 
method will seek to explain continuous change driven by deterministic causation, with 
independent variables acting upon and causing changes in dependent variables.   
The research will closely examine the paradox confronting the IA when sharing, more 
specifically, the reasons the IA may be willing to share information with others, even when the 
risks may outweigh the benefits.  The researcher will also closely examine the behaviors of the 
IA in their decision analysis of intelligence operational mission-based info sharing events.  
Although the intelligence mission scenarios are theoretic, they are possible mission events that 
will serve as the basis for examining a user’s behavior in deciding to share information.  The 
security and info sharing policies are independent variables as well as attitude and intuition.  In 
any military battle, the formidable force is often the entity that has the most complete and 
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accurate information that is collected and shared among other reliable forces, but not the enemy.   
However, although each entity may share information with trusted partners, each side faces 
variations of information leakage, espionage, and political strife that affect the decision to share 
information, and that makes the information valuable in terms of power or less valuable over 
time in terms of diminishing return on investment.  The researcher has selected to use 
intelligence mission scenarios because they examine the actor’s decision and behavior intention.  
How will he/she evaluate risk (consequences) versus benefits, consider the security and info 
sharing policies, and will his/her personal or subjective norm be the controlling factors to the 
sharing decision?  These similarities and differences will allow the researcher to combine literal 
and theoretical replication logic (Yin, 2009). While this will not ensure generalizability of the 
study, it will hopefully add to the robustness and confidence in the findings (Yin, 2009).  To 
deepen the understanding and to help achieve satisfactory validity, the researcher will collect 
data from several sources using different data collection methods, including formal interviews 
with Intelligence community users, analysis of email correspondence, observations of recent 
events, and review of archival documents.  
To improve its relevance to practice, this study will utilize the pluralistic methodology of 
engaged scholarship (Van de Ven, 2007b; Van de Ven & Poole, 1995) as a participative 
approach involving the perspectives of various stakeholders in order to understand complex 
problems (Van de Ven, 2007, p. 9).  Although the researcher will remain in control and direct all 
research activities, advice and feedback will be solicited from various key stakeholders and 
informants, such as public users, information security managers, military IA and other 
researchers, in each step of the research process, including research design, theory building, 
problem solving, and problem formulation (Van de Ven, 2007 p. 26-29).  The research will 
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follow data analysis procedures and display methods suggested by Miles and Huberman (1994b) 
for qualitative case studies using three concurrent flows of activity: data reduction, data display, 
and conclusion drawing and verification.  
As a result, this research will make five valuable contributions:  1) describe the paradox 
of the info sharing decision of an IA analysis of the benefits and risks influenced by the 
organization’s security and info sharing policies and an individual’s behavior intention; 2) 
explain the decision-making behavior of people’s willingness to share information with others, 
even when the risks may outweigh the benefits (to better understand how we might go about 
modifying behavior in a desirable direction); 3) demonstrate how TPB may be used as an 
analytical framework that describes how past behavior of users decisions to share information 
with others in the IC; 4) develop a conceptual framework to evaluate adherence to info sharing 
decision-making in the IC; and 5) provide practical guidance for improving IA decision-making 
in the presence of the paradox. 
1.4  Summary  
The subsequent chapters of this dissertation proposal detail the arguments underpinning 
the research as follows:  
 Chapter 2 Literature Review: This chapter presents a comprehensive review of the 
literature in the area of info sharing by examining what previous research reveals about 
first, the benefits of info sharing and the widespread need for more to conduct military 
intelligence operations; second, the power of information in the organizational 
environment both as positive and negative forces; and last, information sharing policy 
and political ramifications, as well as how info sharing results in information leakage and 
espionage, each of which pose serious threats to our nation’s defense.  In part, this 
chapter focuses on existing knowledge concerning the benefits of info sharing and the 
effects of info sharing because of the value in information or the power associated with 
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owning the information.  The review reveals that few qualitative variance studies exist 
that explore the paradox in info sharing; specifically, the inconsistencies between the 
IA’s behavioral intentions to share information and the organization’s security and info 
sharing policies to actually release information that results in a positive or negative 
outcome based on the value of the data alone or the value of information when 
aggregated with other information.  Why would the IA decide to share certain 
information with little regard for the risk in doing so and for little return (cost-benefit), 
while the disclosure of that same data puts the organization at risk and, doing so, affects 
national interest, meaning greater risk and a higher return?  
 Chapter 3 Theory of Planned Behavior: This chapter provides a description of the 
Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB), its applications in prior case studies, and its 
constructs of a person’s behavioral, normative and control beliefs.  This review helps to 
illustrate how TPB, with its central focus on the background factors that may influence 
the beliefs people hold and how these factors are expected to influence intentions and 
behavior indirectly by their effects on the IA’s decisions to share information.    
Therefore, the researcher’s approach is to use the adaptation of the TPB to inform this 
research study in analyzing the decisions of the IA’s info sharing decision-making risks 
outcomes using intelligence operational mission-based events that are interesting because 
of what  they reveal about the common sense, everyday layman’s view of the world.      
 Chapter 4 Research Design: This chapter discusses the reasons for this study utilizing a 
qualitative, exploratory approach to discover answers to questions through the application 
of scientific procedures.  The main aim is to answer a how or why question with the 
researcher having little control over the contemporary events to be examined.  Further, 
this section explains the use of the engaged scholarship approach in an effort to increase 
the research’s relevance and include the insightful perspectives of key stakeholders to 
gain familiarity with a phenomenon and to achieve new insights into it.  In addition, it has 
to portray accurately the characteristics of a particular individual and situations.  This 
segment also discusses the critical realist philosophy that underlies the engaged 
scholarship approach; a philosophy that adopts an objective ontology but a subjective 
epistemology. 
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 Chapter 5 Data Analysis: This chapter outlines the data collection strategy that will 
follow the three recommended principles of data collection for case studies in order to 
deepen understanding and improve validity through data triangulation:  (1) using multiple 
sources of evidence; (2) creating a case study database; and (3) maintaining a chain of 
evidence.  It also details the methods used in analyzing this qualitative data consisting of 
three concurrent flows of activity: data reduction, data display, and conclusion drawing 
and verification.   
 Chapter 6 Discussion:  This chapter discusses why people share information with 
others; primarily, what influences the individual’s decision that drives him/her to violate 
security and info sharing policies.  The understanding of IA behaviors allows a better 
understanding of how one might go about modifying behavior in a desirable direction.   
The results provide support that background factors do influence the beliefs people hold.   
 Chapter 7 Contributions and Limitations: This chapter discusses the major 
contributions revealing the paradox in info sharing:  1) describing the paradox of the info 
sharing decision of an IA’s analysis of the benefits and risks influenced by the 
organization’s security and info sharing policies and an individual’s behavior intention; 
2) explaining the decision-making behavior of people’s willingness to share information 
with others, even when the risks may outweigh the benefits, (to better understand how we 
might go about modifying behavior in a desirable direction.); 3) demonstrating how TPB 
may be used as an analytical framework that describes how past behavior of users 
decisions to share information with others in the IC; 4) developing a conceptual 
framework to evaluate adherence to info sharing decision-making in the IC; and 5) 
providing practical guidance for improving IA decision-making in the presence of the 
paradox. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1  Information 
Information is a ubiquitous label whose meaning is almost never specified.  According to 
McKinney Jr and Yoos Ii (2010), virtually all the extant IS literature fails to explicitly specify 
meaning for the very label that identifies information and, more important,  that this is a vital 
omission, because without defining what we are talking about, we can hardly know it.    Since IS 
has nominated a plethora of attributes, such as relevant, accessible, timely, accurate, variable, 
flexible, and complete to describe information, Newman (2001), argues that it is important to 
produce what information means, its scope or the implication of the various definitions.  Since 
the pursuit of a more coherent understanding of information has become the subject of a new 
domain, the philosophy of information, McKinney and Yoos Ii (2010) present a taxonomy of 
information that secures the term.  
From a token view, McKinney and Yoos Ii (2010)posit that information and data are both 
tokens manipulated by processes.  There is a widespread view in IS on this understanding, 
particularly from Majchrzak, Rice, Malhotra, King, and B. (2000), who studied a virtual team’s 
use of collaborative software. The software allowed team members to create, store, retrieve, 
distribute, and analyze data, a process that manipulates tokens.  In the syntax view, information is 
the measureable relationship among tokens that reduces entropy.  The tokens in this view are 
mental states; the effectiveness measure of information quantifies the change in mental states.  In 
the representation view, information is meaning.  Meaning emerges from a sign that stands for 
an object to a particular observer.   An example from IS research is the personal information 
construct in privacy research.  Personal information (sign) about an individual (object) gives 
meaning to an unknown their parity (observer).   Finally, in the adaptation view, subjectivity 
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assumptions are introduced to explain how information is created by a system (e.g., person, 
organization).  Information is created when a system perceives differences in its environment, 
which alters that system.  Understanding the taxonomy of information is important to this 
research study because, as posited by McKinney Jr and Yoos Ii (2010, p. 339), “it purports to 
represent what information really is.”  To understand this leads to the value of information and 
its power in military operations and to Intelligence Operators who decide to share information.  
2.2  Paradoxes 
 Quinn and Cameron (1988) define paradox, also referred to as antinomy, as a real or 
apparent contradiction between equally well-based assumptions or conclusions.  They argue that, 
when considered separately, the arguments supporting paradoxical propositions appear sound; 
however, considered together, the arguments appear contrary or even contradictory.  Within the 
literature, much effort has been devoted to resolving or understanding paradoxes, because they 
reveal inconsistencies in our logic or assumptions (Quinn & Cameron, 1988).  Paradoxes can 
arise either from theoretical inconsistencies or from limited frames of reference.  They often 
require us to alter our assumptions, to shift perspectives, to pose problems in fundamentally 
different ways, and to focus on different research questions. According to Quinn and Cameron 
(1988), when studying paradoxes, we are forced to ask very different questions and to come up 
with answers that stretch the boundaries of current theories.  They postulate that the resulting 
formulations are likely to be of interest not only to organizational scholars, but also to all 
scholars of social process; therefore, addressing organizational paradoxes is both exciting and 
challenging and inspires new ideas and creative theory.  
 Within the literature, contingency theory is an alternative approach that is used as a 
response to tensions or conflict within organizational systems.  Early contingency theory from 
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the late 1960s inspired decades of research exploring how contexts influence the effectiveness of 
opposing alternatives (Smith & Lewis, 2011).  However, according to Smith and Lewis (2011), 
the paradoxical studies approach to tensions and conflict involves exploring how organizations 
can attend to competing demands simultaneously as opposed to contingency theory, which 
explores conditions by selecting among competing demands.  They argue that, although choosing 
among competing tensions or conflict might aid short-term performance, a paradox perspective 
argues that long-term sustainability requires continuous efforts to meet multiple, divergent 
demands (Cameron, 1986; Lewis, 2000).  Within the literature, Wendy K. Smith and Marianne 
W. Lewis (2011) found, after surveying over the past 20 years across several different 
management journals, not only have scholars increasingly adopted a paradox perspective, but 
there also has been an increase in the research in studies of organizational phenomena and levels 
of analysis.  Their framework, built on four categories of paradox, represents core activities and 
elements of organizations: learning, belonging, organizing, and performing.  The most 
interesting of the four are organizing and performance paradoxes. Smith and Lewis (2011) 
suggest that organizing paradoxes surface as complex systems, which create competing designs 
and process to achieve a desired outcome.  These include tensions between collaborating and 
competing (Murnighan and Conlon (1991), empowerment and direction (Denison, Hooijberg, & 
Quinn, 1995), or routine and change (Flynn & Chatman, 2001; Gittell, 2004).  Performing 
paradoxes stem from the plurality of stakeholders and result in competing strategies and goals.   
Tensions surface between the differing, and often conflicting, demands of varied internal and 
external stakeholders (Donaldson & Preston, 1995).  
In summary, the literature highlights the richness and scope of a paradox perspective.  
The key finding is that there are conflicting yet inter-related elements identified across a range of 
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organizational phenomena as well across differing levels of analysis.  The literature suggests 
tensions and conflict at the level of the individual (Markus & Kitayama, 1991), dyad (Argyris, 
1988), group (Smith & Berg, 1987), project (Van Marrewijk, Clegg, Pitsis, & Veenswijk, 2008), 
and, most important, the organization (Cameron & Quinn, 1988).   According to Cameron and 
Quinn (1988), there are four strategic approaches that can be used to resolve paradoxes and that 
each represent a different way of transforming research theories and ways of thinking.  First, 
even with accepting the paradox and learning to live with it, we learn that it has a cost to bear.  
To accept a paradox is to acknowledge that things need not be consistent and that the seemingly 
opposed viewpoints can inform one another and our models are just models, incapable of fully 
capturing the conflict, no matter how strongly our logical arrogance tries to convince us 
otherwise.   All the other strategies suggest resolving the tension or conflict between the contrary 
positions.  Bertrand Russell’s (1970) approach, which is the most interesting, attempts to resolve 
this by clarifying levels of reference and the connections among them.  According to Cameron 
and Quinn (1988), level distinctions, such as part-whole, micro-macro, or individual-society, 
have proven extremely useful for social research, and to carry out this analysis, it is necessary to 
specify as precisely as possible how the levels interrelate.  Supporting this approach is Reese and 
Overton's (1978) formulation where one side of the paradox may influence the conditions under 
which the other will operate.          
2.3  Info Sharing Paradox 
As a starting point, the info sharing paradox in this research study refers to the conflict 
between the benefits and risks confronted by the IA.  This conflict is also influenced by the 
organization’s security and info sharing polices as well as the attitude and intuition of the IA.  
Often times the influences that drive an IA’s decision are also in conflict.  The decision results in 
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a positive or negative outcome based on benefits and risks.  Why would the IA decide to share 
certain information with little regard for the risk in doing so and for little return (cost-benefit), 
while that same data disclosed puts the organization at risk and doing so affects national interest; 
meaning greater risk and a higher return?  Paradoxes are well-established concepts in many 
fields of the social sciences, even though the precise contours and cases of the paradox are quite 
controversial.   There are opposing forces in the info sharing paradox between the benefits and 
risks influenced by the organization’s security and info sharing policies as well as the IA’s 
behavior all compete with one another and affect the outcome of the info sharing decision 
exchange.  Another conjecture of this research is the IA’s knowledge, smart info sharer, of the 
organization’s info and sharing policies that facilitate sharing information appropriately with 
others.  However, while navigating the conflict of the benefits and risks, the IA’s knowledge, 
risky info sharer, may be biased when influenced by an IA’s attitude and intuition.  Some 
decisions to share information may put the organization at higher risks because of IA behaviors, 
which could result in little regard for benefits, whether the intentions are inadvertently or 
intentionally.  
The info sharing paradox, weighting the benefits versus the risks, is based on the superior 
information advantage that exists from the organization’s analysis that the IA has  complete 
understanding of all the variables and associated risks (cost-benefit analysis) to sharing the 
information as well as his/her behavior.   The organization’s approach of optimal sharing trends 
is based on the principle that every IA completely believes in and understands the derived policy 
on the different classifications of the information; inter- and intra-agency relationships; and 
continuous internal meetings and agreements with national partners and the sharing of 
information.  The organization’s principle is based on the belief that information advantage will 
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alleviate the information asymmetry between the IA and the organization’s assessment (cost-
benefit analysis) of the risk and other organizational characteristics that will result in a more 
accurate risk decision to the sharing of information.  
In the IS literature, there is a considerable body of academic research on the privacy 
paradox, similar to the info sharing paradox, which is premised on the assumption of rational 
choice (John, Acquisti, & Loewenstein, 2011).  The work has been characterized by the 
following assumptions: 1) people make sensible and consistent trade-offs between privacy and 
other concerns (Derlega, Metts, Petronio, & Margulis, 1993; Petronio, 2000; Posner, 1981; 
Rosenfeld, 2000) and 2) there are reliable differences between individuals in concern for privacy 
(Laudon, 1996).  This holds true for the info sharing paradox as well.  An IA’s decision to share 
information is based on the assumption of a rational choice with sensible trade-offs between the 
benefits and risks associated with sharing information.  The argument is based on the consistency 
and the reliable difference between the IA’s behavior (attitude and intuition) and the 
organization’s security and info sharing policies when considering the benefits and risks trade-
offs.   It has been argued that disclosure decisions are made by balancing “the usefulness of 
privacy with the utility of openness” (Petronio, 2000, p. 37) and that people engage in 
“disclosure management,” such that they disclose information only when they expect a “net 
benefit” (White, 2004, p. 48).   
The similarities in the privacy and info sharing paradox are based on the trade-offs of the 
benefits and risks in disclosure of information.  In the privacy paradox, active and willing 
participants are seen as individuals in the market for personal information and viewed as 
consumers or rational economic agents who are either fully informed or who based their 
decisions on probabilities coming from known random distributions.   In the info sharing 
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paradox, these active and willing participants are the IA who are the individuals in the market 
for privilege information (secrecy or aggregated) and are certainly viewed as the rational 
economic agents in the IC.  As in the privacy paradox, an important factor in the info sharing 
paradox is that the IA are agents who are either fully informed or who based their decisions on 
probabilities also coming from known random distributions. In the privacy paradox, consumers 
not only have the right to manage the privacy trade-offs without regulative intervention, they 
also can use that right in their own best interest.  Unlike the privacy paradox, in the info sharing 
paradox, the IA must manage the benefits and risks of sharing info with regulative intervention; 
however, like the privacy paradox, they often may use their right in their own best interest.  
According to Canada (2012), the reason this exists in the privacy paradox is individuals concern 
about privacy is not absolute.  The argument is the same for the info sharing paradox; info 
sharing is not absolute.  He further explains that consumers are willing to knowingly trade off 
privacy concerns for economic benefits.  He argues that, in some cases, private information is 
consciously exchanged for convenience, personalization, or merely the ability to use a website. 
How does this relate to the info sharing paradox?  The argument in the privacy paradox is the 
very same in the info sharing paradox.  Is there appropriate value or return on investment in the 
trade-off, for the disclosure or share of information?   Therefore, theorists argue that what must 
be considered is the deviation between attitudes about sharing info and the actual behavior in the 
handling of sharing the info.  
Weighing the risks and benefits in the privacy paradox are the same in the info sharing 
paradox.  Often the IA does not have all the information for complete assessment of the risks and 
benefits when sharing info and consumers are faced with the same challenge. For example, in an 
online transaction, a consumer may possess incomplete information when considering the risks 
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and benefits in sharing info.  The consumer is not fully aware of the nature and existence of 
privacy invasion.  In other words, data collection by third parties may be taking place without the 
knowledge of the consumer.  In considering the risks and benefits to sharing the privacy 
information, the consumer lacks complete information regarding the alternative or the ease of not 
only protective technologies, but also understanding how the disclosed information will be used 
by the collecting agent or the third party. Canada (2012) argues that most people do find it 
difficult enough just to find and understand a company’s privacy policy, much less to monitor 
the company’s use of personal information and detect when violations have occurred.  In info 
sharing, the IA constantly navigates the paradox of the benefits and risks that are influenced by 
the organization’s security and info sharing policies.  This is relevant to the IA’s decision of 
sharing info based on the concept of bounded rationality.  The concept bounded rationality refers 
to our inability to acquire, memorize, and process information that is relevant to the decision-
making process and applies to both the info sharing and privacy paradoxes.  Specifically in the 
privacy context, John, Acquisti, and Loewenstien (2011) define bounded rationality as the 
inability to calculate and compare the magnitudes of the payoffs associated with various 
strategies the individuals may choose in privacy situations.  He also suggest that it refers to the 
inability to process all the stochastic, meaning non-determinative, information related to risks 
and probabilities of events leading to privacy costs and benefits. Theorist arguments suggest 
even the most privacy-concerned individuals are not informed and cannot inform themselves 
about privacy risks, even when that information is available because they simple cannot process 
that amount of information.  Therefore, individuals resort to simplified mental models, 
approximate strategies, and heuristics, such as intuition, an educated guess, or common sense.     
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2.4  Government Inter- and Intra-Agency Info Sharing 
Akbulut-Bailey (2011) postulates that, “the improvement of information sharing among 
government agencies has become one of the highest priorities of decision makers as the lack of 
information sharing has been identified as a major point of failure leading to and responding to 
these horrific events” (p.53).  From a historical perspective, Boudreau and Robey (2005) 
postulated that the need for info sharing was from the public administration reform in the 20
th
 
century based on the conviction that, “only through efficient government could progressive 
social welfare be achieved” (p. 3).   Thus, government info sharing acquired its necessity from 
the goal of public service where the lens of efficiency was the pillar to democracy (mixed 
metaphor) (Wenjing, 2011).   
From an inter- and intra-agency perspective, scholars from different theoretical traditions 
propose that, in order to realize the most important benefits from the use of information and the 
info sharing technologies, agencies should integrate their information across organizational 
boundaries (Caffrey, 1998; Dawes, 1996; Gil-Garcia et al., 2007; Ramon Gil-Garcia et al., 2009; 
Javernpaa & Staples, 2000; Pardo et al., 2006; Richardson & Asthana, 2006).  Navarrete (2009) 
argues the national boundaries are changing and governments from different countries are 
collaborating and sharing information in order to face complex public problems, such as 
environmental degradation, terrorism, public health, national security, and economic crises.  
Within the literature, as suggested by Akbulut-Bailey (2011), there is very limited academic 
research on info sharing among government agencies. Chong, Lin, Ooi, and Raman (2009) 
conducted the first major study on inter-agency info sharing.  Their study focused on the benefits 
and risks of info sharing among state agencies.  Conversely, Dawes (1996) conducted research 
on inter-agency info sharing as it relates to the expected benefits and manageable risks.  Each of 
  
 
 
28 [Type a quote from the document or 
the summary of an interesting point. 
You can position the text box 
anywhere in the document. Use the 
Drawing Tools tab to change the 
formatting of the pull quote text box.] 
them categorized the benefits and risks into three areas as they related to state or inter-agency 
info sharing.  
However, previous research has given minimal consideration to a fourth area of the 
behavior of users who share information while navigating in the risks and benefits as it relates to 
sharing information, specifically the reasons users are willing to share information with others, 
even when the risks may outweigh the benefits. Table 1 includes a fourth area that is considered 
in this research study and extends the areas considered by both Dawes (1996) and Chong et al. 
(2009).      
Table 1:  Categories of Benefits, Risks, and Barriers (Dawes, 1996) 
   
Category Benefits Barriers/Risks 
Technical  Streamlines data management 
 Contributes to information 
infrastructure 
 Incompatible technologies 
 Inconsistent data structures 
 Poor technical skills 
 WikiLeaks/Live Leak of 
damaging information, 
inadvertently or intentionally 
Organizational  Supports problem-solving 
 Expands professional networks 
 Organizational self-interest 
 Domain professional 
frameworks 
Political  Supports domain-level action 
 Improves public accountability 
 Fosters program and service 
coordination 
 External influences over 
decision-making 
 Power of agency discretion 
 Primacy of programs 
Individual   
Behavior 
 Tacit Knowledge  
 Superior Info Advantage 
 Absorptive Capability 
 Intelligence Analysis 
 Media Exposure 
 Attitudes  
 Values, Emotions, and 
Intuition 
 Individual Interests 
 Age, Gender, Race, 
Ethnicity, and Religion 
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Is there a limit to the amount of information that a user has when considering to share?  Are there 
certain types of information too damaging to share?  Are there specific situations where the 
information shared is more detrimental to the agency that outweighs the benefit to share?  
Clearly, from this view, the answer to these questions is fundamentally “yes.”  However, a 
paradox exists with the benefits of info sharing.  There are an equal number of challenges, 
barriers, and risks not to share information.  Both have an impact on determining the power of 
the information and the sharer’s decision to share the information during a time of war or crisis.  
This research does not suggest that information sharing should be avoided, nor does it imply that 
every scenario will lead to negative outcomes.  This research offers another perspective: that 
information behavior that socially and culturally constitutes ways to identify, seek, assess, use, 
and share information changes and develops with the user’s behavior and knowledge of the risks 
and benefits to sharing info.  The main idea is that, if the user is someone knowledgeable about 
the risks versus the benefits, this may reflect a superior decision. While if someone who is less 
knowledgeable about the risks versus the benefits, his/her decision to share information may be 
induced by behavioral biases.  Since this issue has been given minimal attention in the info 
sharing literature, the current research provides needed insight in this area. 
With intra-agencies’ info sharing, there is a trend to encourage groups to share information 
and knowledge (Zhang, Zeng, Wang, Li, & Geng, 2011; Zhang, Dawes, & Sarkis, 2005).  
Conversely, Wheatley (2006) highlights that, in the bureaucratic model, information flows within 
agencies are strictly controlled; the point being, with limited access to the sharing of information 
and knowledge, members lack the capability to develop integrated solutions to problems.  In 
addition, members within the agencies often do not share information scattered among intra-
agency communities (Ardichvill, Page, & Wentling, 2005; Cress & Kimmerle, 2006).  Within 
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the literature, many factors can influence inter-/intra-agency info sharing.  According to Yang 
and Maxwell (2011), the relationships between these factors are complex and each factor can 
influence the other.   
In inter-agency info sharing, Landsbergen and Wolken (2001)  state that interoperability 
across agencies represents cross-boundary info sharing.  Within the literature, researchers have 
recognized the importance of cross-boundary info sharing, especially in the area of e-government 
research (Cresswell, Pardo, Canestrato, Dawes, & Juraga, 2005; Pardo et al., 2006; Pardo & 
Tayi, 2007; Schooley & Horan, 2007).  Specifically, Pardo et al. (2006)  state that leaders and IT 
executives in the public sector have increasingly recognized the importance of inter-agency info 
sharing to improve the efficiency of government agencies.  However, info sharing and 
knowledge management can involve complex interactions between participating government 
agencies.  Dawes' (1996) research in inter-agency info sharing and Zhang' et al. (2005) research 
in e-government knowledge sharing both define and view influential factors from the three 
primary perspectives of technology, management, and policy. The focus of this research study, 
however, is on the inter- and intra-agency info sharing from a user’s change in behavior 
perspective and his/her decision to share based on the value or power of this information.     
In summary, (Yang & Maxwell, 2011) postulate that, during the last 15 years, public and 
government organizations have shifted from a model that emphasized only information 
protection to one where cross-organization info sharing is the new goal.  This is primarily due to 
events such as 9/11, policy changes that emphasized cross-government coordination to improve 
efficiency and reduce waste, and changes in technology that allowed organizations to exchange 
information based on standard transmission and information exchange protocols (Yang & 
Maxwell, 2011).  Scholars from different theoretical traditions propose that, in order to realize 
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the benefits from the use of information and the info sharing technologies, agencies should 
integrate their information across organizational and national boundaries (Caffrey, 1998; 
Cresswell et al., 2005; Dawes, 1996; Gil-Garcia et al., 2007; Navarrete, 2009).  In addition, there 
are a number of factors that influence info sharing across inter- and intra-agency boundaries, and 
the relationships among these factors influence info sharing.  Finally, it is important to realize 
governments from different countries are collaborating and sharing information in order to face 
complex public problems in their environment.   
   Therefore, there are complex and paradoxical effects to the Intelligence and business 
leaders’ decision-making with this shift to sharing of more information.  Conversely, recent 
events, such as Edward J. Snowden, an American computer specialist who worked for the CIA 
and NSA and supposedly leaked details of several top-secret U.S. and British government mass 
surveillance programs to the press, suggest there should be greater emphasis on information 
protection.  Today, the insider threat underscores the complex nature of sharing of information 
and the decision-maker’s dilemma in determining the organizations’ risks versus the greater 
good to info sharing.  Within the literature an emphasis is placed on the need for more inter-
/intra-agency info sharing and to interoperability between diverse information systems. (Gil-
Garcia et al., 2009; JinKyu, Nitesh, Jing, Marijn, & Rao, 2010) suggested that, after the U.S. 
terrorist attacks and world natural disasters, our fragmented nature of policy-making and service 
provisioning revealed the need for more inter- and intra-agency information sharing.  
2.5  Inter- and Intra-Agency Info Sharing Benefits, Risk and Barriers 
 Although the benefits realized from info sharing differ from organization to organization 
or agency to agency, Dawes (1996) classified them into three categories: technical, 
organizational, and political.  He posits that technical benefits refer to potential positive results. 
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They relate to the processing and managing of information, such as reduced duplication of data 
collection, processing, and storage, as well as the creation of formal standards or shared technical 
infrastructure.  The organizational benefit refers to positive results for the organization as a 
whole that includes better coordination, improved decision-making processes, and reduced costs; 
and the political benefit refers to the impact on the political image and policy goals of the 
organization leading the info sharing and integration effort.   
 Important benefits from government integration and info sharing will continue to be 
incentives for governments to design and implement initiatives to reduced duplication of data, 
more coordinated efforts, and efficiency.  Although Dawes (1996) classified them into three 
categories, in terms of benefits as outcomes only, some other elements suggested by other 
researchers are active public participation, transparency, efficiency, cost savings, policy 
effectiveness, and service quality (Bertot, Jaeger, & Grimes, 2010; Fedorowicz, 2009; Garson, 
2004; Luna-Reyes, 2010; Reddick, 2009).  However, the literature suggests that organizational 
benefits are the more powerful incentives for government agencies in info sharing, particularly in 
terms of efficiency and cost savings. In contrast, public organizations place more emphasis on 
policy effectiveness, equity, openness, and accountability, from which enhancement can occur 
through information integration (Gil-Garcia, 2012).  Political benefits from government info 
sharing are enhanced public image, value creation, increased government transparency and 
accountability; integrated planning and more comprehensive public information.   Efficiency, 
being the goal of public administration, could be easily accepted as the justification of the 
necessity of government info sharing (Wenjing, 2011).  
 Sharing relevant, timely, and complete information for intelligence operations transforms 
the capability of intelligence systems to facilitate government info sharing and integration in a 
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networked environment.  From a military intelligence or even a business operations perspective, 
the more this information is complete, the more it offers the government, corporate entities, and 
their partners a real opportunity to share databases and make decisions based on the sharing of 
information.  In addition, it offers important benefits, such as increased productivity, improved 
decision-making, and lower administrative burden, assuming that information already held 
somewhere in the inter- or intra-agency is not duplicated.   Further, it offers better enforcement 
or greater information availability, higher information quality resulting in fewer mistakes, and 
integrated services (Gil-Garcia et al., 2009; Jhingram, Mattos, & Pirahesh, 2002; Landsbergen & 
Wolken, 2001; Otjacques, Hitzelberger, & Feltz, 2007).  
 In summary, Gil-Garcia (2012) argues that the important benefits of government info 
sharing in the current government environments leads to the need for solutions consistent with 
what he refers to as the “whole-of-government approach.”  In fact, Gil-Garcia (2012) suggests a 
need for more coordination and collaboration among government agencies, but also between 
government agencies and other social actors to realize the benefits from info sharing.  Again, this 
specifically highlights the importance of the use of info sharing across organizational boundaries 
and the sharing of critical information in order to solve complex problems.  To this end, the 
primary gain of the efficiency benefit as well as others mentioned throughout the literature, the 
trend is towards increased inter-organizational collaboration and information integration among 
government agencies, between government agencies (intra-agencies), other branches of 
government, national partners, and corporate organizations.  Gil-Garcia (2012) postulates that, 
over the next 10 years, we could witness the emergence of a highly integrated virtual State in 
which all branches of government and multiple social actors seamlessly interact through the use 
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of sophisticated technologies that integrate business processes, physical infrastructure, 
organizational resources, and new institutional arrangements.  
 There are many influences on inter- and intra-agency info sharing.  Yang and Maxwell 
(2011), suggest this type of sharing can viewed from a layered approach.  In Figure 1, Factors 
Influencing Organization Info sharing, the influences to info sharing for the focus of this 
research are on the member’s beliefs, and characteristics of information.  IT focuses primarily on 
the technological issues, which dominate much of the early literature, and suggests that IT could 
play a central role in the management of an organization’s info sharing.  Hislop (2002) posits 
there are criticisms to the literature, which overemphasizes the technological issues and neglects 
social and cultural factors that can lead to a number of problems. 
Figure 1:  Factors Influencing Organization Info Sharing (Yang and Maxwell, 2011) 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
The key in the analysis of Yang and Maxwell’s (2011) research study is that, while info sharing 
is influenced by the factors in layers one and two, members’ beliefs at layer three  that are 
focused towards intra-agency information sharing can be developed and mediated by self-interest 
Intra-Agency Information 
Sharing 
Member’s Beliefs: 
Self interest and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 
Information Ownership or Information 
Stewardship, and Reciprocity 
Layer 3 
  
 
 
35 [Type a quote from the document or 
the summary of an interesting point. 
You can position the text box 
anywhere in the document. Use the 
Drawing Tools tab to change the 
formatting of the pull quote text box.] 
and cost-benefit analysis.  Although Figure 1 depicts the influences in intra-agency info sharing, 
what is missing is the impact in the understanding of the attitude, intuition, and tacit knowledge 
of the actor and the organization’s interest as it relates to the value of the information.  The 
influences are missing a critical element.  The IA behavior influences the decision to share 
information that may very well be in conflict with the organization’s security and info sharing 
policies.  The IA is, in fact, the entity that decides on the amount of risk that the organization 
inherits. Thus, the main idea of this research is, if the user, whose decision is to share, is 
someone knowledgeable about the risks versus the benefits, this may reflect a superior decision, 
while the decision of someone who is less knowledgeable about the risks versus the benefits, 
may be induced by behavioral biases.  It has been argued that disclosure decisions are made by 
balancing “the usefulness of privacy with the utility of openness” (Petronio, 2000, p. 37) and that 
people engage in “disclosure management,” such that they disclose information only when they 
expect a “net benefit” (White, 2004, p. 48).   
 In layer one, focus is on information technology, organizational structure, and 
organizational cultures.  Yang and Maxwell (2011) argue that bureaucracy is an influential 
influence on info sharing.  However, as a bureaucratic organization grows larger both vertically 
and horizontally, distributed duties in different hierarchies and sub-units become the drivers of 
decreased efficiency for info sharing.  According to Creed, Douglas and Miles (1996) and Tsai, 
2002, the formal hierarchical structure of bureaucracy can create barriers that impede info 
sharing activities within the organization.  Horizontal structures of bureaucracy, such as 
departmentalization, inevitably bring obstacles to info sharing between different departments of 
an organization because of different functional mandates, processes, and expectations (Argote, 
Ingram, Levine, & Moreland, 2000; Willem & Buelens, 2007).  In addition, bureaucracy is an 
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organizational structure where power and authority are centralized in higher management levels 
(Hall & Tolbert, 2004; Kim & Lee, 2006). Tsai (2002) argues that centralization has a significant 
negative impact on knowledge sharing in a multiunit organization. Kim and Lee (2006) point out 
that centralization can hinder initiatives of inter-group information exchange and collaboration. 
Interest in sharing information and knowledge can be reduced because an organizational member 
or group has limited action autonomy and needs approval from supervising levels regarding most 
decisions (Kim & Lee, 2006).  
 In layer two, primary focus is on the characteristics of information, absorptive capability, 
incentives, power, social aspects and trust.  Yang and Maxwell (2011) argue that researchers 
assert the importance of incentive systems in motivating organizational members to share 
information with others in different groups or departments (Willem & Buelens, 2007). Through 
direct and indirect effects of incentives, sharing of information and knowledge can be greatly 
increased (Connolly, Thorn, & Heminger, 1992; Jian & Jeffres, 2006; Willem & Buelens, 2007). 
With performance-based reward systems, organizational members are more likely to share 
information and knowledge (Kim & Lee, 2006). Bonus systems are also able to increase the 
quality of shared information (Ardichvill et al., 2003). On the other hand, researchers discovered 
that when the system is not specifically designed for encouraging info sharing, a general reward 
or incentive system can actually deter the info-sharing activities of an organization (Zhang et al., 
2005). Bock, Zmud, Kim and Lee (2005a) claim that anticipated extrinsic rewards can have 
negative influence on organizational members' attitudes toward sharing of information and 
knowledge. Barua, Ravindran and Whinston (2007) assert that general incentive systems can 
only increase info-sharing activities when a special type of information dependency exists 
between workgroups. Because of reward and incentive systems, workgroups and/or 
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organizational members may compete with each other for better performance; one potential 
consequence of this is that they might become reluctant to share information and knowledge 
(Barua, Ravindran & Whinston, 2007; Bock et al., 2005a; Zhang, Dawes & Sarkis, 2005). 
 Finally, in layer three, lie members’ beliefs.  According to Constant et al. (1994), member 
perceptions of self- interest can reduce support for info sharing in an organization. Cress and 
Kimmerle (2006) claim that info sharing presents a social dilemma. Social dilemmas are 
situations where personal interests are inconsistent with collective interests. According to Yang 
and Maxwell (2011), in social dilemmas, individuals are assumed to put more weight on their 
short-term personal interests than on long-term organizational interests (Dawes, 1980). 
Researchers point out many factors that organizational members may consider as costs to their 
sharing of information (Cress & Kimmerle, 2006; Goodman & Darr, 1998). For instance, before 
sharing tacit information and knowledge, a contributor may need to spend significant time and 
effort to articulate, prepare and arrange the information. In addition, a contributor may expect 
that sharing of information would evoke requests for further clarifications and assistances. The 
extra work may compete with the contributor's work time and resources. Furthermore, the fear of 
incurring criticism because of possible inaccurate and irrelevant information also affects the 
cost/benefit equation (Ardichvill et al., 2003). Without receiving clear recognition and benefit for 
a contribution, contributors may be reluctant to share information (Cress & Kimmerle, 2006; 
Goodman & Darr, 1998). By applying theories of collective action (Hardin, 1971, 1982) and 
social dilemma (Dawes, 1980; Jian & Jeffres 2006) extend the discussion by claiming that 
individuals are rational and self-interested, acting to maximize individual benefits and minimize 
individual costs. In their proposed utilitarian perspective, a contribution to the collective good 
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such as sharing of information and knowledge is a matter of calculation and compromise 
between cost and benefit (Jian & Jeffres, 2006; Marks et al., 2008) 
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THEORY OF PLANNED BEHAVIOR 
3.1  Key Constructs of Theory of Planned Behavior 
“Since its introduction 26 years ago, the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB), has, by any 
objective measure, become one of the most frequently cited and influential models for the 
prediction of human social behavior” (Ajzen, 2011, p. 1113).  In the TPB, the most detailed 
substantive information about the determinants of a behavior is contained in a person’s 
behavioral, normative and control beliefs.  The theory does not specify where these beliefs 
originated; it merely points to a host of possible background factors that may influence the 
beliefs people hold.  These are factors of a personal nature, such as personality and broad life 
values; demographic variables, such as education, age, gender and income; and exposure to 
media and other sources of information.  Factors of this kind influence intentions and behavior 
indirectly by their effects on the theory’s more proximal determinants.  Most empirical studies 
assess a few demographic characteristics if only considered as control variables.  Some studies, 
however, focus on one or more background factors that, for intuitive or theoretical reasons, are 
relevant to the behavior under investigation. This research study will focus on IA attitudes and 
intuition beliefs. The adaptation of the TPB in the exploration of behavioral, normative, and 
control beliefs allows investigators the opportunity to identify important determinants of socially 
significant behaviors, thereby gaining a better understanding, according to Ajzen (2012), of how 
we might go about modifying behavior in a desirable direction.    
3.2  Applications of Theory of Planned Behavior  
A good application of TPB is reported by the study of Manning and Bettencourt (2011).  
The investigators used the TPB as their conceptual framework to examine adherence to a 
  
 
 
40 [Type a quote from the document or 
the summary of an interesting point. 
You can position the text box 
anywhere in the document. Use the 
Drawing Tools tab to change the 
formatting of the pull quote text box.] 
medical regimen.   Unlike Kor and Mullan (2011), who dealt with their behavioral category of 
sleep-related activities by assessing the TPB constructs in relation to each behavior, Manning 
and Bettencourt (2011) aggregated several regimen adherence behaviors and then assessed the 
TPB constructs with reference to the category as a whole.  Within their case, the intentions to 
adhere were predicted very well, but the theory accounted for only a small proportion of variance 
in behavior. However, in addition to measuring the TPB constructs, the investigators also 
assessed depressive symptoms as a possibly relevant background factor.  The results indicated 
the degree of depression correlated negatively with intentions and reported adherence to the 
medical regimen.   
Other investigators in research studies (Courneya, Bobick, & Schinke, 1999; Courneya & 
McAuley, 1993; Rhodes & Courneya, 2003; Rivis, Sheeran, & Armitage, 2011) examined the 
role of specific personality traits in TPB (openness, conscientiousness, extroversion, 
agreeableness and neuroticism) in the context of the TPB.  These research studies assessed the 
general tendency to compare oneself to important others.  The results provide a different 
perspective from simply postulating a simple effect of the background factors on intentions and 
behavior, and their approach and method allowed them to examine the possibility that these 
variables influence the predictive validity of intentions relative to perceived prototype similarity.  
These investigations, like other studies (Sheeran, Orbell, & Norman, 1999; Trafimow & Finlay, 
1996), show that there may be stable individual differences that influence the relative weights of 
the different predictors in the TPB.  
Even though TPB has emerged as one of the most influential and popular conceptual 
frameworks for the study of human action (Ajzen, 2001; Ajzen, 2011, 2012), there are problems 
that remain (Armitage & Conner, 1999, 1999a; Sheeran et al., 1999; Sutton, 1998).  One such 
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problem is the nature and measurement of perceived behavioral control.  Since TPB is derived 
from TRA, it is assumed that most human social behavior is under volitional control and, 
therefore, can be predicted from intentions alone.  The construct of perceived behavioral control 
was added in an attempt to deal with situations in which people may lack compete volitional 
control over the behavior of interest.  The arguments suggest that behaviors can be subject to 
unforeseen obstacles, and volitional control over behavior is, therefore, best considered as a 
matter of degree rather than an actual type of behavior.  Other arguments are on the specific 
facets that form perceived behavioral control that may include self-efficacy, perception of 
control and others.     In addition, researchers argue whether future behavior should be observed 
or self-reported.  The results within the literature suggest a gap exists between intention and 
behavior, and many researchers concluded that some elements are apparently missing in the 
model and have tried to enrich it by the inclusion of further constructs, such as moral norms and 
past behavior.  In response to these criticisms, Ouellette and Wood (1998) argue and confirm that 
a relationship between past behavior and intention exist under special circumstances.  “In 
domains that facilitated development and execution of habits, past behavior was a strong 
predictor and intention relatively weak, In domains that did not facilitate habits, past behavior 
was a relatively weak direct predictor and intention was quite strong” (Ouellette & Wood, 1998, 
p. 66).  As such, though TPB may have shortcomings like all social theories, these shortcomings 
must be recognized, and the criticisms do not prevent it from being an effective tool in 
examining socio-technical process in organizations.   
3.3  Theory of Planned Behavior and Decision-Making 
The Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) uses background factors to analyze individuals’ 
attitude, intuition, past behavior, and beliefs that affect their decision-making.  Hodgkinson, 
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Sadler-Smith, Burke, Claxton, and Sparrow (2009a, p. 277) noted that, until recently, only the 
“bravest and most far-sighted” would recognize the utility of intuition in management decision-
making.  However, it is argued that increased time pressure, rising work pressure and ambiguity, 
high decisions costs, inadequate information, and fast-paced change have undermined the utility 
and effectiveness of relational decision-making models (Sinclair & Ashkanasy, 2005).  It is also 
argued that the changing nature of work practices and structures creates environments where 
human information-processing capability is exceeded by the volume and complexity of the 
information that humans have to process (Hodgkinson et al., 2009a), thereby, according to Allen 
(2011),  making intuition a more widespread strategy for decision-making.  Allen (2011) further 
defines intuition as having the following information processing characteristics: reliance on long-
term memory input processed automatically and sub-consciously or pre-consciously, input is 
holistic, and output from the process is feelings that can serve as a basis for judgments in 
decisions.  Therefore, Allen (2011) postulates that intuition can be seen as a distinct and very 
different mechanism for information processing and decision-making. 
Using the TPB framework, Ajzen (2011) describes that human behavior is guided by 
different subjective probabilities.  As depicted in Figure 2, the framework is based on the 
assumptions of: 1) beliefs about the consequences of the behavior; 2) beliefs about the normative 
expectations of other people; and 3) beliefs about the presence of factors that may facilitate or 
impede performance of the behavior.  In Figure 2, the background factors, or actor’s personal 
beliefs, may include a wide range of factors.  This research study will focus on the background 
factors of IAs’ attitudes, intuition, and their experiences.  Ajzen and Fishbein (1973) argue in the 
TPB framework that the aggregation of background factors the behavioral beliefs produce 
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attitude towards behavior, normative beliefs result in subjective norms and control beliefs 
generate perceived behavior control.   
Figure 2:  Theory of Planned Behavior, (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1973) 
 
 
The combination of all the elements leads to the formation of a behavioral intention (Ajzen, 
2011; Fishbein & Ajzen, 2005; Ajzen & Martin, 1970). An important postulation comes from the 
research done by Ouellette and Wood (1998), which confirmed a relationship between past 
behavior and intention under special circumstances (Ajzen, 2011). The combination of all the 
elements leads to the formation of a behavioral intention (Ajzen, 2011; Fishbein & Ajzen, 2005; 
Ajzen & Martin, 1970). “In domains that facilitated development and execution of habits, past 
behavior was a strong predictor and intention relatively weak.  In domains that did not facilitate 
habits, past behavior was a relatively weak direct predictor and intention was quite strong” 
(Ouellette and Wood, 1998, p. 66).  IA actions are typically triggered by environmental events 
and, because their activities are repetitive, their performance often requires minimal attention, 
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Ouellette and Wood (1998), this is habitual behavior and past behavior may be a strong 
predicator, where intention may be relatively weak. 
With its roots in social psychological approach to behavior, TPB postulates changing 
behavior is a matter of changing the cognitive structure underlying the behavior in question.  The 
theories are best seen as a series of four hypotheses.  The first hypothesis is made under the 
assumption that behavior is primarily a function of an individual’s intention to perform that 
behavior.  The second hypothesis is the intention to perform the behavior and is seen as a 
function of the weighted combination of two factors, a personal factor that is the attitude toward 
the behavior and a social factor that is referred to as subjective norm.  Thus, in this hypothesis, 
the attitude toward the behavior is the feeling of favorableness toward the behavior and the 
subjective norm, which suggests the perception that people of importance think that the 
individual should or should not perform the behavior. The third hypothesis suggests the 
underlying attitude toward the behavior is an underlying cognitive structure of behavioral beliefs 
that performing the behavior will lead to certain outcomes and the evaluation of these outcomes.  
Finally, the last hypothesis suggests the subjective norm is an underlying cognitive structure of 
normative beliefs that particular individuals or groups think that one should or should not 
perform the behavior and the individual’s motivation to comply with each of these significant 
others. 
  
 
 
45 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
4.1  Subjects 
As mentioned before, this study will endeavor to answer the question: How does the IA 
navigate the paradox between the between the benefits and risks affected by individual behaviors 
and organizational factors that inhibit information sharing decisions?  A conjecture of this 
research study is that the info sharing of highly skilled or smart sharers would reflect superior 
decisions on the information to share, while the decisions of relatively less skilled or risky 
sharers are more likely to be induced by behavioral biases.  However, the central gap where 
previous literature has given minimal consideration is the behavioral changes in users who share 
information in understanding the analysis of the risks and benefits as it relates to sharing 
information, as well as the reasons users are willing to share information with others, even when 
the risk may outweigh the benefits.  As such, it is a study of the social, cultural, and behavioral 
aspects of the IA and inter-/intra-agency organizational security and info sharing policies.  It 
seeks to understand why IA make the decision to share information and how they do it.  It 
endeavors to understand the context within which they make decisions when analyzing the cost 
and benefit trade-off as it relates to putting the organization at risk inadvertently or intentionally.  
The IA navigates the paradox between the benefits and risks affected by their behaviors 
and organizational factors that inhibit their info sharing decisions by performing and managing 
intelligence activities and functions including developing, evaluating, and providing intelligence 
information.  To accomplish this, they instruct air crews on collecting and reporting requirements 
and procedures; matters such as evasion, recovery, and code of conduct; recognition techniques; 
and assessing offensive and defensive weapon system capabilities. They also prepare mission 
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reports, conduct intelligence debriefings of U.S. and allied military personnel involved in combat 
operations requiring careful analysis of the benefits and risks associated with successful 
execution of missions.  Since this unique group within the IC often prepares, maintains, and 
presents intelligence displays, reports, and briefings and is responsible for producing all-source 
intelligence, situation estimates, order-of-battle studies, and other intelligence reports and 
studies, it represents important actors that navigate the paradox between the benefits and risks  
that are affected by their behaviors and the organization’s factors that inhibit their info sharing 
decisions.  In navigating the paradox, this actor group also performs geo-locational mensuration 
functions, maintains, and uses geospatial databases, targets materials, imagery, and other 
intelligence products shared within the IC.  These actors extract coordinates and positional 
relationships from digital database systems and non-automated stereo-photographic models, and 
identify and establish unit requirements for intelligence reference materials typically stored in 
databases and for sharing. They also maintain intelligence reference files, automated intelligence 
databases, automated and non-automated systems applications, target materials data logs and 
prepare target materials for execution that includes performing targeting, weaponry, and damage 
assessment functions.  
The IA group is important to this research study as opposed to typical IT users because of 
their specialty skill, mandatory knowledge, and system access.  They are knowledgeable in 
intelligence organizations and systems; collection and reporting systems, procedures, and 
methods; intelligence information sources; techniques of identifying, collating, evaluating, and 
analyzing information as well as geographical and cultural aspects of foreign countries.  They are 
required to be skilled at military capabilities of potential enemy offensive and defensive weapon 
systems; special operations; procedures for acquiring, updating, and maintaining intelligence 
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documents, maps, and charts; map and chart use techniques; graphic, oral, and written 
intelligence information presentations; target planning and materials; target folder construction 
techniques; and capabilities and application of automated data handling and management 
systems.  They must also understand security classification marking and control; U.S. sensor 
systems, regional physical characteristics relative to radar significance; methods of verifying 
target intelligence information derived from imagery; basic electromagnetic theory; 
computerized systems supporting target intelligence and mission planning systems; digital terrain 
and feature databases; and principles of precise positioning systems and targeting and 
weaponeering. 
IA use IT to help navigate the paradox between the benefits and risks of info sharing.  
The information held by IA alone is not as useful if it is not shared in the IC and the technology 
associated with information is generally oriented to the efficient transfer of that information to 
another individual or entity.  IA capitalize on the speed of processing information, manipulation 
of large data sets, and dynamic adaptability to other IA needs.   With the speed of processing, IA 
benefit from the correlation of data, its manipulation, with less redundancy resulting in gaining 
efficiency, and greater access across the community.  IT also allows for the efficient storage and 
retrieval of information as well as enables the possibility of efficient info sharing by allowing 
electronic data to flow around the IC and around the world at the speed of light.  An important 
aspect to navigating the paradox between the benefits and risks of info sharing is to increase the 
effectiveness and efficiency in sharing information.   IA must consider access, which is part of 
the analysis in navigating the risks and benefits for effectiveness and efficiency.  The access to 
shared information across a large and unique community allows efficiency as well as greater 
capability for accomplishing missions effectively.  It also allows building of partnerships with 
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others to share information.  IA must also navigate the paradox through military service 
organizations, national partners, and other government partners since these environments are 
unpredictable during operational missions.  IA often cannot anticipate the nature of the demands 
of info sharing they will face.  Analysis of the benefits and risks in the info sharing paradox in an 
ad hoc environment adds weighted pressure to IA decisions.  These ad hoc environments are 
characterized by collaborative working, unlimited communication across all levels, and broad 
sharing of situation information.   In situations of time pressure, IA do not fall back on well-
establish routines, each doing what it is they are best doing.  To the contrary, there is a 
behavioral change when sharing information in understanding the analysis of the benefits and 
risks as it relates to sharing information; specifically, reasons IA may be willing to share 
information with others, even when the risks may outweigh the benefits.    
4.2  Information Theory Adaptation 
 
The qualitative approach uses the adaptation of the TPB to inform this research to 
provide a deeper insight into the decision-making process by IA, highlighting the moderating 
impact of past behavior on the self-efficacy-intention linkage.  In Figure 3, the conceptual 
framework, the IA benefits and risks analysis is moderated by organizational factors (security 
and info sharing policies) and behavioral intentions (attitude, values, and intuition), which 
influence info sharing decisions that result in desirable or undesirable outcomes.  What would 
cause an IA to violate the rules and share information?  How much does the behavioral intention 
influence his/her decision?  Kidwell and Jewell's (2008) research study confirms that, on the one 
hand, past behavior does influence consumer decisions, and on the other “can influence the 
extent of deliberative processing when making decisions.” In other words, past behavior 
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obviously moderates the influence “… of attitude and internal and external control on intention” 
(Kidwell & Jewell, 2008, p. 1162).  In TPB, the assumption is that a decision is the result of a 
deliberative, goal-oriented process; behavioral options considered, consequences of the option 
evaluated and the decision to do something made.  Will an IA demonstrate risky behaviors?  
Gibbsons, Gerrad, and Lane (2003) developed the Prototype-Willingness Model (PWM) based 
on three assumptions about risky behaviors among adolescents and young adults.  Gibbsons et al. 
(2003) posited risky behavior is neither reasoned nor intentional, which led to additional 
constructs of TPB with the predictors of behavioral expectations and behavioral willingness. 
Figure 3:  Conceptual Framework 
 
 
IA access to information processing is approved based on security clearance level, need 
to know, and system access to the appropriate classification levels of the information.  Generally, 
an IA has access to data at three classification levels: Unclassified, Secret, and Top Secret.  
Although there are other compartmented classifications within each of the general levels of 
access, the focus of this research study is on the access to information at these three general 
levels.  It is important to understand how an IA attempts to process information since it is part of 
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his/her internal process to decision-making.  According to Neisser (1967), most people operate in 
a perception-action cycle, suggesting that the senses take in information from the environment, 
the mid brain performs computations on that information and the outputs of those computations 
are used to guide subsequent goad-directed actions.  However, Newell and Broder (2008) argue 
that, since most people’s information capacity is limited,  they must use cognitive models to 
propose heuristics or shortcuts. 
 The organization’s security and info sharing policies have increased in complexity when 
sharing across an intra-/inter-agency.  First, it changes rapidly with the increasing need for intra-
/inter-agency sharing of information.  There are partnerships that form and disband based on an 
organization’s interest and mission execution. At any moment, a partnership must be formed 
under the conditions that info sharing is necessary based on a new agreement between the U.S. 
and a national partner because of the relationship in a particular environment that is later 
disbanded under the conditions that the partner now puts the organization at risk.  The 
organization’s need for sharing information often changes and is often unclear at different levels 
within the organization or across inter-/intra-agencies.  At various levels, organizations have 
strict policies to sharing information, but they are created generically at very high levels and 
execution is done at much lower levels and could very well be left to different interpretations by 
individuals that could put the organization at risk.  These types of conditions intensify when 
considering how IA seek information to share.  Savolainen (2006) schematic model for 
information seeking highlights what IA face, in addition to understanding the organization’s 
security and info sharing policies.  Savolainen (2006) posits they are processing the following 
continuously: 1) concerns with the problem or task at hand to collect intelligence information for 
analyzing; 2) concerns with fulfilling the need of the IC for what has been just analyzed and 
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shared; 3) considering and identifying potentially relevant information sources and channels; 4) 
selecting and accessing information sources from intra- and inter-agency partners; 5) judging the 
relevance of the information to be shared; 6) interpreting the information to be shared to be 
appropriately classified; and 7) determining if new or modified information is necessary, based 
on classification and the intended source of the shared information.  These are all important 
factors that affect IA decision-making, particularly given the limited amount of time that he/she 
has in certain environments. 
 The organization’s security and info sharing policies are used to steer info sharing events 
and serve as the foundation for how to access information for operations, as well as how, when, 
and why an IA would share information with others.  The organization’s policies and goals are in 
the best interests of the organization to limit the risk of loss of information inadvertently or 
intentionally, and, most important, to protect the information shared with sources that will not be 
harmful to national defense.  Also within the organization’s security and info sharing setting, 
there is information processing during collection and distribution where the consumption triggers 
the desire for power by decision-makers.  In the info sharing setting, having control over access 
to pieces of information and how and what is shared is power in the IC, particular in battle or 
conflict with the adversary.  In the behavioral sciences, power is defined as the ability to 
influence others in a way that is desirable to the one exerting the influence (Ahituv & Carmi, 
2007). This is important because, in the info sharing setting, exerting influence on another is not 
necessarily based on an individual’s rank or authority, but more on the pieces of information 
known by the IA and the ability to influence him/her to the desired outcome.  Often the desired 
outcome that strongly influences an IA to share information is successful execution of an 
operational mission. The relationship between power and info sharing  may cause the IA to 
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engage in an inward-focused processing style characterized by attention to the self’s internal 
attitudes and desires, with little consideration for the views and needs of others.  This is 
important because the internal attitudes and desires influence the decision to share or not to 
share.  Brinol, Petty, Valle, Rucker, and Becerra (2007) postulated that by priming power, which 
is providing control over the evaluation of a subordinate in a role-playing task, prior to 
processing a message about a topic, enhances the tendency to try to validate one’s initial views 
on the topic that results in reduced information processing.  Research on the organizational 
cultural values’ view of power is that it is interpersonal and something that is used for advancing 
one’s personal agenda obtaining praise and admiration from others, and, hence, maintaining and 
promoting one’s powerful status in the eyes of others.   However, it also can be organizational 
driven, specifically when the primary focus is to accomplish the organization’s goals or 
objectives, such as successful execution of an operational mission.  
 The assumption is the value of the information with regards to national defense is already 
pre-determined, given the classification level of the information; however, in the info sharing 
paradox, an IA contribution is often able to influence the usefulness of a piece of information for 
others.  For example, an IA may prepare the information very carefully to make it valuable for 
the specific purpose for a unique group, or he/she may just contribute to the analysis of a 
photograph needed for a specific mission. In many cases, higher value of pieces of information 
for the organization means higher risks to the organization, but does not correspond with higher 
risk for the IA.  Costa-Gomes, Crawford, and Broseta (2001) demonstrated that individuals in 
social dilemmas consider their own benefits, but also the benefit to others in making decisions.  
In the study by Cress, Kimmerle, and Hesse (2006), participants were provided with two types of 
information: information with high value to others and information with low value to others.   
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The study demonstrated that people do, in fact, consider the benefit to others, and contribute 
more information of high value than information of low value.   
 Since IA perform and manage Intelligence activities and functions, including developing, 
evaluating, and providing Intelligence information in info sharing situations, they often influence 
the usefulness of this data for others.  With the information being more valuable to others, which 
is continuously gaining value by contributions by all within the IC, the organization’s investment 
is even higher with national Intelligence libraries where IA can seek and retrieve data 
individually.  Individually, the information contributed is often labeled and can be traced to the 
IA responsible for the contribution, and tagged appropriately for the proper classification, such 
as unclassified, secret, or top secret.  The labeling and tagging ensures the proper classification, 
but does not take into account the contribution to the entire community and is not higher in value 
from the perspective of the contributing IA, who is only focused on his/her single source of 
information and its classification.  For example, an IA may develop and evaluate a map for a 
particular target and place it in a national Intelligence library classified at the lowest 
classification level for a high rate of sharing.  A different person could retrieve the work 
completed by the previous individual and add important pieces of information keeping it at the 
lowest classification level as possible.  However, the additional information added to the map 
involves multiple targets; therefore, the information returned to the library results in a higher 
value or higher classification.  The info sharing process then generated information of much 
greater value to the IC, but not necessarily to the developer of the product focused on his/her 
piece of the information.   
 Some researchers (McClintock, 1978; Messick & McClintock, 1968) posited that human 
behavior is influenced by values that people assign to different action alternatives and their 
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consequences. What is the behavior that influences an IA to share classified material with others 
not authorized?  Could this behavior have been influenced by values unconsciously inherited 
from being a member of the IC, practicing the mandated security and info sharing policies? Or 
could it have been influenced by another IA as social peer pressure that impacts  the IA’s 
decisions and actions resulting in success or failures?  In TPB, the most detailed substantive 
information about the determinants of a behavior is contained in a person’s behavioral, 
normative, and control beliefs.  What are the most influential behavioral factors in the decision-
making of IA when sharing information with others? Are there differences in the decision-
making when an IA believes the recipient has authorization versus no authorization?  (Allport, 
1935, 1968) pointed out that the concept of attitude “is probably the most distinctive and 
indispensable concept in contemporary American social psychology” (1968, p. 59).  With this 
understanding, often, consequences of action alternatives will not only affect the actors 
themselves but also others, most important, the IC.  Using TPB, these values include an actor’s 
background factors (social, personal, information) and beliefs (behavior, normal, control).   
The background and beliefs of an individual represent a behavior intention, as well as a 
stable preference for distribution outcomes (inadvertent, desired, or intentional) between one’s 
own self and the organization.  The background factors and individual beliefs are extremely 
important influencing factors in the conflict between the behavior of IA and the organization’s 
security and info sharing policies in the paradox of information sharing.  Do IA consider their 
own benefits and risks in sharing information but also the benefit and risks to the organization?  
Will they contribute more information of high value than information of low value?  The logical 
answer is that IA may very well, in their decision to share information, consider the benefit and 
risks to others.  This could result in contributing more information of value or higher 
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classification that benefits an IA during a successful mission, but violates the organization’s 
security and info sharing polices to do so.  On the other hand, it may be consistent with the 
organization’s security and info sharing policies, resulting in sharing information of low value or 
lower classification, but also in an unsuccessful mission.                
As mentioned, this research focuses on the social, cultural, and behavioral aspects of IA 
and inter-/intra-agency organizational security and info sharing policies.  Is the loss of 
information publicly and the decisions made to share this information inadvertent or intentional?  
Do IA consider the benefit to other Intelligence sources, and contribute more information of high 
value than information of low value that puts the organization at risk?  The researcher selected an 
exploratory approach and the theoretic operational mission-based scenario events because they 
are similar in mission and impact to the gravity in actual loss of valuable information, yet 
different in terms of info sharing, decision-making, level of authority and responsibility, 
organizational structure, and consequences endured from the sharing of information.  Given the 
similarities, this study will use literal replication logic to look for similarities within each 
scenario and likewise, given the differences, use theoretical replication logic to identify 
contrasts, if possible, between organizations within the IC (Yin 2009, p. 54).  Though combining 
literal and theoretical replication does not ensure generalizability of the study, it may add to the 
robustness and confidence in the findings (Yin, 2009).  The empirical part of the research will be 
informed by the interviews conducted and analyzed from responses to these particular mission 
scenarios.  Interviews, that is, empirical data collection, may also be informed by recent events 
because we do not have a lot of knowledge in these areas.  Therefore, in lieu, we will explore 
using the theoretic mission scenario-based empirical data to uncover the unknown, to answer 
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questions, to identify the relationship that the past has to the present, and to assist in 
understanding the culture in which we live.   
As engaged scholarship, this research adopts a critical realist philosophy of science.  As 
described by Van de Ven (2007a, pp. 37-38), this view adopts an objective ontology that there is 
a real world out there but that our individual understanding is limited.  This view also espouses, 
however, a subjective epistemology where all facts, observations and data are capable of being 
adapted to acceptable theory; no form of inquiry can be value-free and impartial; understanding 
complex reality demands the use of multiple perspectives; evidence may converge but might also 
be inconsistent or contradictory; and, models are selected that better fit the problem they are 
intended to solve. 
With this assumption of a subjective epistemology, the researcher conducted the study 
using the seven fundamental principles recommended by Klein and Myers (1999).  Drawn from 
anthropology, phenomenology, and hermeneutics, these principles include the principles of 
hermeneutic circle (understanding is achieved by iterating between the interdependent meaning 
of parts and the whole they form); contextualization (critical reflection upon the social and 
historical background of the research setting); interaction between the researchers and the 
subjects (critical reflection on how the data were socially constructed through interaction 
between the researchers and participants); abstraction and generalization (relating the idiographic 
details to the application of theory); dialogical reasoning (sensitive to possible contradictions 
between theoretical preconceptions and actual findings); multiple interpretations (sensitivity to 
possible differences in interpretations by participants); and, suspicion (sensitivity to biases and 
distortions in narratives collected from participants).  As Klein and Myers (1999) point out, these 
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principles are interdependent and the researcher did not apply these principles mechanically but 
rather used the researcher’s own judgment.  
Finally, in TPB, Ajzen (2012) argues the reasoned action approach explains human social 
behavior in terms of considerations that are readily accessible when people think about 
performing a behavior in question.  He postulates that we gain an understanding of the factors 
that motivate people’s behavior by examining their beliefs about the behavior’s likely 
consequences and how these beliefs produce an attitude toward the behavior.  He further 
explains that, by considering their beliefs about the expectations and behaviors of important 
others and how these beliefs lead to the formation of a subjective norm, and by studying their 
beliefs about control factors, we can learn how these beliefs produce a sense of behavioral 
control or self-efficacy.  Ajzen (2012) suggests there is no real argument to suggest that people 
make decisions in a rational fashion, but one may assumed that intentions and behavior follow 
reasonably from these kinds of considerations, often spontaneously without a lot of cognitive 
effort.  A large body of empirical research attests to the predictive validity of the TPB. Various 
techniques have been developed to increase behavioral control, although these techniques have 
not been used in a TPB context.  Some methods focus on imbuing individuals with a sense of 
self-efficacy or perception of behavioral control.  These methods can thus influence behavioral 
intentions; that is, the motivation to engage in the behavior, but they may also provide valuable 
information about actual behavioral performance. 
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4.3  Research Methodology 
4.3.1 Data Collection.  This study follows the three principles of data collection 
recommended by Yin (2009 p. 114-124):  (a) using multiple sources of evidence; (b) creating a 
case study database; and (c) maintaining a chain of evidence.  To deepen the understanding and 
help achieve satisfactory validity through data triangulation, the researcher collected data from 
several sources with different data collection methods.  The primary source of data includes 
interviews and documents on the IC’s security and info sharing policies. The concentrating of the 
research questions in the semi-structured interview guide seeks to understand why IA make the 
decisions to share information and how they do it.  The Theory of Planned behavior (TPB) uses 
background factors to analyze individuals’ attitudes, intuition, past behavior, and beliefs that 
affect their decision-making. TPB suggests that the changing nature of work practices and 
structures creates environments where human information-processing capability is exceeded by 
the value and complexity of the information that humans have to process, which suggests 
intuition is a strategy for decision-making.  The interview questions address whether an 
individual uses intuition as an influencing factor to the decision.  In addition, the questions are 
situated to examine if past behavior does influence the analyst’s decisions and moderates the 
influence and control on intention.  TPB is based on the assumption that a decision is the result 
of a deliberative, goal-oriented process; behavioral options are considered, consequences of the 
option are evaluated and the decision to do something is made.   
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4.3.2 Data Analysis Method. This study followed the data analysis procedures suggested 
by Miles and Huberman (1994a) for qualitative case data. Miles and Huberman (1994b, pp. 10-
12) define data analysis as consisting of three concurrent flows of activity: data reduction, data 
display, and conclusion drawing and verification. These three types of analysis and the data 
collection process form an interactive, cyclical process.  This research study moved among the 
four activities during data collection, data reduction, display and conclusion, and verification 
throughout the life of the research.  Miles and Huberman (1994b) describe data reduction as data 
“condensation.”  In this form of analysis, the researcher sharpens, sorts, focuses, discards, and 
organizes collected data.  During the interviews, an enormous amount of data was collected and 
the researcher used Miles and Humberman’s (1994b) approach to focus and sharpen the 
collected data.  As suggested by Miles and Huberman (1994b), when appropriate and in order to 
improve validity and help in analysis, the researcher used methods for summarizing (contact 
summary sheets, document summaries, case analysis meetings, and interim case summaries); 
different approaches to coding (at both descriptive and inferential levels); methods of thinking 
about data (annotations and memoing); and methods for producing extended reports (vignettes 
and pre-structured cases).  In this research study, these methods were used continuously 
throughout the life of the research and before fieldwork commenced through initial research 
questions and the choice of a conceptual framework from which the researcher operated. 
In applying these methods, there were three critical steps taken to establish an 
environment to examine the behavior in the IA who shares information when analyzing the risks 
and benefits as it relates to sharing information, as well as the reasons an IA is willing to share 
information with others, even when the risks may outweigh the benefits.  The purpose is to 
examine the change in behaviors of IAs in their decision analysis of a typical intelligence 
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operational, mission-based info sharing event.  To create the appropriate environment, it was 
important to develop actual operational mission-based scenario events that would serve as a basis 
to examining IA behavior in deciding to share information while analyzing the benefits and risks 
associated with sharing the information.  Using actual Intel operational mission scenarios that 
were previously conducted or currently being executed could not be used for the semi-structure 
interviews since the scenarios could potentially classify the research study as well as put the IA 
at risk of violating security policies.   
However, it was important to develop theoretic mission-based scenarios that simulated 
actual missions in complexity for critical thinking, effectiveness, and thoroughness, while 
keeping the research study at the appropriate unclassified level.  Therefore, the first step was 
creating a working group of IAs from junior to senior levels to develop potential theoretic 
operational mission based scenarios that simulated actual missions and would effectively serve 
as the basis for examining IA behavior in deciding to share information while analyzing the 
associated benefits and risks.  The group was tasked to generate operational mission-based 
scenarios that would cause IA to critically think what they would do in particular information 
sharing situations in the IC when deciding whether to share or not share information with others 
in the IC.  They were also asked to take under consideration in generating the scenarios to also 
formulate them where an IA would consciously consider any potential benefits and risks 
associated with the decision when sharing the information with others.  The group consisted of 
eight professional IA who generated 10 scenarios that could potentially serve as the basis for use 
in the research study.  The theoretic operational mission-based scenarios collectively generated 
by the working group had to pass a second level of review for use and release.  Thus, the next 
step in creating the appropriate environment consisted of submitting the scenarios to the 
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respective  Special Security Offices (SSO) for review and determination of releaseability, to 
ensure they did not pose a threat to users or the IC, were not used in previous operational 
missions, or were perceived as a potential effect on a future operational mission.  Finally, after 
review by SSO, three scenarios were determined as releasable and as simulating operational 
missions, and were adopted for use in the research study.   
Although the intelligence mission-based scenarios are theoretic, a group of IA evaluated 
them as potential mission events that could serve as a basis to examining the behavior of an IA’s 
decision when sharing information with others while analyzing the associated benefits and risks.   
In any military battle, the formidable force is often the entity that has the most complete and 
accurate information that is collected and shared among other reliable forces, but not the enemy.   
However, although each entity may share information with trusted partners, each side faces 
variations of information leakage, espionage, and political strife that affect the decision to share 
information and that makes the information valuable in terms of power or less valuable over time 
in terms of diminishing return on investment.  The researcher proceeded with the group selected 
theoretic operational mission-based scenarios because they would allow examination of the 
actor’s decision and behavior intention.  Will  the actor evaluate risk (consequences) versus 
benefits, consider the security and info sharing policies, or will the actor’s personal or subjective 
norm be the controlling factors to the decision?  These similarities and differences will allow the 
researcher to combine literal and theoretical replication logic (Yin, 2009).  In addition, to deepen 
the understanding and to help achieve satisfactory validity, the researcher collected data from 
several sources using different data collection methods, including formal interviews with IC 
users, analysis of email correspondence, observations of recent events, and review of archival 
documents.   
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The interview data collected were analyzed interpretively using NVivo, a qualitative data 
analysis (QDA) computer software package, to uncover subtle connections, rigorously justifying 
findings, and to code.   The overall decision-making of the subjects is based on the context of the 
theoretic operation mission-based scenario environments.  The mission-based scenario 
environment provides the context for collective action as a network of interacting elements 
governed by certain motives.  The subjects engaged in decision-making activities for a reason or 
reasons that form the motivation (such as to defend and protect the country or to simply support 
a fellow IA).  The outcome is the transformation of the decision; success or failure or intentional 
or inadvertent release of information.  The behavior of the subject is moderated by influences 
from the security and info sharing policies and the individual’s beliefs (behavior intentions; 
attitude and intuition).  They interact to influence the IA’s analysis of the benefits and risks to the 
info sharing decision.  For example, the security and info policies, peer pressure, and mission 
success influence a subject, but are also influenced by beliefs, experience, and tacit knowledge.   
The researcher developed a semi-structured interview guide (See Appendix B) and 
conducted formal, semi-structured interviews with IA in the IC.  The researcher designed 
theoretic mission-based scenarios that simulated an environment consistent with actual 
operational missions.  It provided a context where multiple and interdependent decisions are 
made as a function of the decision-maker’s actions and/or in response to environmental events.  
The questions were situated to understand the context in which the IA make these decisions, 
specifically when analyzing the trade-offs between the benefits and risks, while at the same time 
understanding the associated consequence as it relates to putting the organization at risk 
inadvertently or intentionally. IA were randomly selected from journeyman, junior and senior 
level grades within the military services and DoD civilians across the community based on their 
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unique job specialty code.  Once selected, the IA received an email asking if they would like to 
participate in a research study, strictly voluntary.   
There were 20 IA randomly selected and sent an email notification to participate 
voluntarily in the research study.  There were 18 IA that responded as volunteers, which 
consisted of six journeymen, five junior, and seven senior IA.  The subjects consisted of two 
females and 16 males, equaling seven civilians and 11 military members.  The IC subjects 
consisted of a population of IA from the military service and IC agencies as follows:  six in the 
Air Force, three in the Army, one from the Defense Intelligence Agency, three in the CIA, one 
from the NSA, two in the Navy, and one each from National Reconnaissance and National 
Geospatial Agencies.     
The interviews were private and conducted in separate and secure environments.  All 
subjects were interviewed in a location different from where they were currently employed.  This 
was to ensure subjects felt relaxed, without any peer pressure, and comfortable in providing 
natural responses to the questions, and to help protect them from any scrutiny by an employee or 
employer identifying them as a participant in the research study.  The information was collected 
using a digital recording device and later encrypted for security protection.  The interviews lasted 
between 20 and 30 minutes.  The sessions of the subjects that were digitally recorded were later 
transcribed and the digitally recorded data were destroyed.  In addition, to maintain anonymity, 
the subjects were made aware of the destruction of the digitally recorded data and that names 
would not be used in the research study.  This approach was to ensure the subject responses were 
natural and not hindered by the idea that the information provided would be incriminating or 
traceable to a single individual.  Archival documents, such as website information, policy 
documents, standards and guidelines, operating procedures, published instructions, ICD, and 
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published strategies and visions were used for corroboration and clarification on the data 
collected through the interviews.  
The subjects were given an option to randomly select from three different theoretic 
operational mission-based scenarios.  The subjects were asked to choose a number between one 
and nine.  If a subject’s selection was between the numbers one and three, it resulted in scenario 
number two; if the selection was between four and six, it resulted in scenario number one, and; if 
the selection was between the numbers seven and nine, it resulted in scenario number three.  
After reading the scenario, the subject immediately answered the question that followed the 
scenario and then later answered a list of eight additional questions.  The questions were the 
same for each scenario; however, since the interview was a formal semi-structured approach, 
subjects’ responses did lead to additional inquires.   
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DATA ANALYSIS 
5.1  Results 
 
How do IA navigate the paradox between the benefits and risks affected by individual 
behaviors and organizational factors that inhibit info sharing decisions?  In addition, is there a 
behavioral change, and why might IA share info with others, even when the risks may outweigh 
the benefits?  In this exploratory study, respondents were asked what their first instinct was in 
their benefit and risk analysis in each of the operational scenarios.  Displayed in Table 2 are the 
subjects’ responses depicting their info sharing decisions from analyzing the theoretic 
operational mission scenarios.   There were a total of 18 subjects that reviewed and analyzed the 
risks versus the benefits to sharing information and decided to share or not share information to 
successfully accomplish an operational mission.  After reading the respective scenarios, overall 
responses to the questions immediately following the scenarios resulted in 10 out of 18 subjects 
who actually shared the necessary information that actually violated security and info sharing 
policies.  Conversely, only two out of 18 subjects would not share information that was needed 
to successfully execute the mission because of religious belief; meaning they were in non-
compliance with their oath of office or enlistment and the Uniform Code of Military Justice.  
However, when the question was rephrased to replace one’s religious belief with an individual’s 
sibling or a spouse, five out of 18 would not share the information needed. 
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Table 2:  Info Sharing Decision 
           
 Decision to Share Information       
           
 
Mission 
    
Yes No 
Number of Subjects 
Responding (N=18) 
           
 Scenario 1     6 2 8   
 (Violation of IC Info Sharing Policy)        
           
 Scenario 2     4 0 4   
 (Incident/Security Violation)        
           
 Scenario 3     4 2 6*   
 (Compliance with oath of office/enlistment and UCMJ)      
           
 Total     14 4 18   
           
 * Rephrased question to replace religion with sibling or spouse 1 5    
           
           
 
 
Scenario 1: 
 
A communication between two foreign terrorists was acquired on 12 January 
2008 using Executive Order (EO) 12333 collection.  You discover the 
communication between the foreign terrorists includes vital raw Signals 
Intelligence (SIGINT) data (imagery) that a fellow Intel Analyst needs to 
successfully execute a mission on 28 January 2013; however, under EO 12333, 
the raw traffic is inaccessible to your fellow Analyst online because raw 
SIGINT data is only retained for up to five years.  Since you were the 
originator of the raw SIGINT data, you have the raw data necessary to assist 
the Analyst in successful execution of the mission.  Do you share the 
information with the Analyst to execute the mission successfully?  
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Eight subjects selected and responded to Scenario 1.  Five out of the six subjects 
responded “yes,” they would share information with the other IA to execute the mission 
successfully.  Only two  subjects referenced that the violation of EO 12333 would not allow 
them to share information with the other IA.  Typically, SIGNIT raw traffic is inaccessible after 
five years and could be destroyed or must have a destruction waiver to maintain it for longer than 
five years.  In either case, since this scenario is intentionally situated beyond the five-year point, 
so it requires additional authority for access and to determine availability.  The specific intent 
behind this question is to examine the actor’s decision and behavior intention.  Will the actor 
evaluate risk (consequences) versus benefit, consider the security and info sharing policies, or 
will the actor’s personal or subjective norm be the controlling factors to the decision? 
 
Scenario 2: 
 
As an Intelligent Analyst, you served a tour in Afghanistan and had access to 
classified information.  During your tour, you were privy to information that 
included imagery of raw SIGINT data tag, indicating that the legal authority 
category is the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), F? Amendment 
Act (FAA).  You have transferred to a new position as an IA.  In your new 
position, you noticed you still have access to the SIGINT data without the 
appropriate re-justification.  Simultaneously, during your discovery of your 
continued access, you also notice traffic of a special operations mission that 
requires use of the information under the legal authority of FAA.  The target 
is to capture foreign terrorist and you have access to the imagery of raw 
SIGINT data that you can access and help with the capture of the terrorists.  
You know the IA are slightly less skilled at Intel analysis since your departure 
and have somehow missed the raw SIGINT data aggregation.  Do you share 
the information with your previous IA to help capture the terrorist? 
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Four subjects selected and responded to Scenario 2.  All four subjects responded “yes,” 
they would share information with the previous IA to help capture the terrorist.  This scenario 
illustrates a reportable incident since the IA still has access to the data without re-justification.  
The scenario suggests that, at the same time the IA discovers his/her access, discovery of a 
mission being executed to which he/she can provide assistance is also identified.  The IA knows 
the appropriate skill set does not exist at the previous position and the unit will more likely lose 
an opportunity to capture the terrorist if there is no engagement to assist by sharing analysis of 
the information and the data from the intelligence library database.  The rules are clear: if IA 
discover they still have access, the IA must contact a manager to have his/her access removed 
and inform leadership of the issue. In addition, since this involves Federal Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance, it must be reported because of legal authority under the act. The specific intent 
behind this question is to examine the actor’s decision and behavior intention.  Will the actor 
evaluate risk (consequences) versus benefits and consider the security and info sharing policies, 
or will the actor’s personal or subjective norm be the controlling factor to his/her decision?   
Scenario 3: 
 
As an IA assigned to the Defense Intelligence Agency, you’re scheduled for 
your deployment rotation to Afghanistan.  You and another IA are 
collaborating on the analysis of targeting information for the area to which 
you are being deployed.  On your deployment, you are assigned to supporting 
the Central Intelligence Agency.  You learned that the area you’re being 
deployed to is in an area where you were originally born.  In addition, on your 
deployment, during collaboration with another Analyst, you learn a mission 
will be executed that targets a particular asset that doesn’t necessarily reside 
well with your religious faith or beliefs.  The day of mission execution, the 
junior Analyst develops the package for targeting from the analysis of the data 
in storage.  You review the analysis of the junior Analyst and realize there’s 
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additional information needed that you collaborated on prior to your 
departure for deployment. You are torn between your religious faith or belief 
and successful execution of the mission.  The current Analyst is less skilled 
then you are and unaware of your prior analysis and your pertinent 
information.  Do you share the information with the Analyst to ensure 
successful execution of the mission?  Do you share the information if the target 
is where a sibling or spouse currently lives? 
 
Six subjects selected and responded to Scenario 3.  Four out of the six subjects responded 
“yes,” that they would share information with the other IA to execute the mission successfully.  
The other two subjects responded that they would “request separation of involvement and being 
accountable in execution of the mission.”  However, when followed up with rephrasing the 
question to replace religious belief with a sibling or spouse, one subject stated “yes,” she would 
still share information with the other IA to execute the mission.  Five subjects stated “no,” they 
would not share the information, and two of the responses were the same, stating they would 
“request separation of involvement and being accountable in execution of the mission.”  This 
scenario examines where subjects may intuitively place their values: on the information they 
intend to share or, in this particular scenario, on their religious faith or belief.  In this particular 
scenario, there are no rules being violated in sharing the information or not sharing the 
information.  However, if the Analyst chooses not to share because of religious faith or belief, 
the Analyst would be in non-compliance with his oath of office or enlistment and the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice.  The important dilemma in this scenario is that only the Analyst knows 
that his/her decision to share or not to share the information is based on his religious faith or 
belief.  The basis for this question is to examine the actor’s decision and behavior intention.  Will 
he/she evaluate risk (consequences) versus benefits, consider his/her own personal values over 
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those of the organization, and will his/her personal or subjective norm be the controlling factors 
to his/her decision? 
5.1.1 Results Data Analysis.  How do IA navigate the paradox between the between the 
benefits and risks affected by individual behaviors and organizational factors that inhibit info 
sharing decisions?  In addition, is there a behavioral change and why might IA share information 
with others, even when the risks may outweigh the benefits?  Table 3 displays the reasons given 
by respondents as explanations for sharing information.  It turns out that the administrative 
pressure of security and information policies had only a small amount of influence on a subject’s 
decision to share information; only two respondents mentioned administrative pressure.  In 
scenario one, two different responses from IA regarding their first instinct in their decision to 
share or not share information was as follows:  
Although the raw SIGINT data is inaccessible, I would be able to 
talk about my experience and my knowledge with my fellow 
analysts and tell them what I know, so I would share the 
information that way . . .  common sense or whatever says, hey, we 
got lucky.  Let’s go ahead and share it since we’re talking about 
terrorists, you know.  We’re not talking about, you know, like 
citizens or any of that kind of stuff. 
 
 
Yes I would . . . I felt like it was pretty easy . . . a necessity to the 
mission.  There may have been some restrictions I may have 
violated, but the mission is more important. 
 
Conversely, 16 of the respondents felt their decision to share information was mostly influenced 
by the organization’s goal of successful execution of operational missions; meaning an IA’s first 
thought is the perceived successful execution of the mission (since success is determined 
afterwards).  In addition, to ensure the perceived successful execution of the mission, IA sought 
mission first and fix policy later to adjust to meet the mission needs as their approach to sharing 
of information.  They also viewed accuracy as a vital element to aid in the execution, potentially 
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overlooking the importance of  the value of  information shared in the IC.  The subjects were 
asked in the theoretic operational based scenario execution of each mission, which was more 
important, the accuracy of the data or the value of the information being shared?  It turns out that 
eight of the respondents thought providing accurate data during operational missions is more 
important than the value of the information.  In scenario one, the subject’s response is sought to, 
what is more important, sharing of accurate data for mission accomplishment or understanding 
the value of the information being shared?  A subject responded with the following:  
I would say ensuring accurate data is shared for mission 
accomplishment . . . a lot of times getting the accurate data to the 
right people who can determine the value is more important to 
mission accomplishment. I may not necessarily have the knowledge 
to know the value of the information, but if I can get that accurate 
data to the people who’ve got more experience and analyze that 
bigger data I would . . . you know, it’s more important to share it 
than to understand it. 
  
This is substantial in providing explanation for the subject’s response of feeling constrained by 
security and info sharing policies; in fact, 10 of respondents felt constrained by the 
organization’s policies, but not enough to avoid violating them.  Remember, as displayed in 
Table 2, 10 out 18 of the subjects actually violated the security and info sharing policies during 
analysis of the operational mission-based scenarios.  It also alludes to the explanation of why 
subjects felt there was only a small amount of influence, and only two  respondents felt 
administrative pressure from security and info sharing polices on their info sharing decision; 
subjects are not fully aware nor focused on the value of the information that requires protection 
through the enforced security and info sharing policies.   
In line with the subjects’ feeling of the perceived successful execution of the operational 
mission, the feeling magnifies when it involves ensuring that others do not impede the perceived 
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success.  Thus, subjects felt compelled to assist others with sharing information that culminated 
in the perceived successful execution of the operational mission; 14 of the respondents felt 
compelled to share information with the other IA to ensure successful execution of the 
operational mission.  In scenario three, subjects responded whether they would share or not share 
information with another junior analyst when it conflicted with religious belief.  One IA’s 
response was as follows: 
My first instinct was to share the information because what he had 
was wrong or lacking and I had additional information that would 
provide clarity and ensure successful execution of the mission, but 
it hurts, very painful, very painful concept and I’m conflicted . . . 
for, you know, the rest of my life. 
 
In the data analysis, it was important from an IA’s perspective that the organization 
characterized the actions or viewed the info sharing decisions as positive.  Even when the 
subject’s info sharing decisions conflicted with the subject’s beliefs, when asked if they thought 
the decisions aligned with the organization’s security and info sharing policies, respondents 
thought mission first above all else.    
Wow! . . . That depends on the leadership, how they review that 
(positively or negatively), but how do you punish somebody who 
comes forward and says hey listen, I’ve been involved with this 
violation that resulted in successful execution of a mission.  It’d be 
more of a cover up afterwards . . . deniable plausibility. 
 
Although subjects actually violated security and info sharing policies, most believed or 
felt their actions aligned with the organization’s desired outcome of the perceived operational 
mission success.   In most cases, subjects’ beliefs were in conflict with the security and info 
sharing policies; six of respondents felt conflicted, although the desire to obtain the 
organization’s desired goal of mission success impacted their behavioral intention, and thus 
influenced the decision to share information.  However, if the stakes were too high, based on 
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personal beliefs (values and intuition), subjects’ beliefs actually conflicted with the security and 
info sharing policies. Only six of the respondents actually shared information where others’ 
beliefs (values and intuition) greatly influenced their decision not to share, which outweighed the 
organization’s goal of operational mission success. 
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Table 3:  Info Sharing Reasons 
Reasons Given for Sharing Information 
           
Reasons/Motives 
    Number of 
Respondents 
Mentioning 
Items (N=18) 
 
Scenario 1 
 
Scenario 2 
 
Scenario 3 
           
Pressure from others if mission was 
unsuccessful 
   11 5  6 
           
Felt compelled to help another IA    14 6 4 4 
           
Execution of a successful mission is the 
most important objective 
  16 8 4 4 
           
Administrative pressure from security & 
info security policies 
 
Felt constrained by security & info policies                                                     
  2 
 
 
10 
2 
 
 
6
 
 
 
4 
 
 
 
 
           
Mission first, fix policy later to adjust to 
meet mission needs 
 16 8 4 4 
           
Accuracy of data is more important than 
the value of information 
  8 8   
           
Beliefs conflicted with security and info 
sharing policies 
  6   6 
           
Experience/knowledge conflicted with 
security & info sharing policies 
  6 6   
           
Personal beliefs/values conflicted with 
mission success 
   6   6 
Total       95 49 16 30 
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DISCUSSION 
The aim of this exploratory study was to examine the behavior of IA, and to investigate 
the paradox of info sharing in the IC.  Why do people share information with others; primarily, 
what influences the individual’s decision that drives him/her to violate security and info sharing 
policies?  The understanding of IA behaviors allows a better understanding of how one might go 
about modifying behavior in a desirable direction.   The results provide support that background 
factors do influence the beliefs people hold.  These factors, attitudes and intuition and broad life 
values, influence intentions; and, thus, an IA decision in info sharing. Hodgkisno, Salder-Smith, 
Burke, Claston, and Sparrow (2009a, p. 277) noted that, until recently, only the “bravest and 
most far-sighted” would recognized the utility of intuition in management decision-making.  
Why did IA actually violate security and info sharing policies so easily?  There is a major 
external influence on IA in accomplishing the organization’s goal of mission success.  IA 
construct their own version of reality based on information provided by the senses, although this 
sensory vision is moderated by complex mental processes that determine which information is 
attended to, how it is organized, and the meaning attributed to it.  According to Hodgkinson et 
al., (2009a), the changing nature of work practices and structures creates environments where 
human information-processing capability is exceeded by the volume and complexity of the 
information that humans have to process; thus, intuition is a more widespread strategy for 
decision-making (Allen, 2011).  What people perceive, how readily they perceive it, and how 
they process this information after receiving it, are all strongly influenced by past experience, 
education, cultural values, role requirements, and organizational norms (the goal of successful 
operational missions), as well as by the specifics of the information received.   
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6.1  Intuition 
 
IA intuition relies on long-term memory input processed automatically and sub-
consciously or pre-consciously; input is holistic, and output from the process is feelings that 
serve as the basis for judgments in decisions, all of which, according to Allen (2011), are 
characteristics of information processing which is a distinct and different mechanism for 
information processing and decision-making.  This intuition, based on the results of the study, 
conflicted with the organization’s security and info sharing policies, partly because the attitude 
towards these security and info sharing policies hinders the perceived successful operational 
mission.  The results also provide support to IA actions triggered by environmental events and 
because their activities are definitely not repetitive, and their performance requires greater 
attention, even with experience over time where intuition is a strong influence on behavioral 
intention.  This is contrary to expectations as described by Outllette and Wood’s (1988) 
postulation of habitual behavior, where past behavior may be a strong predicator and where 
intention may be relatively weak.  However, perceived behavioral control, part of TPB, 
accommodates the non-volitional elements inherent in all behaviors.  According to Ajzen (2002), 
even when not particularly realistic, perceived behavioral control is likely to affect intentions. A 
high level of perceived control strengthens a person’s intention to perform the behavior, and 
increases effort and perseverance.  Hence, attitude and intuition affect behavior indirectly, by its 
impact on the intention of the decision.  Accordingly, when perceived behavioral control is 
veridical, it provides useful information about the actual control a person can exercise in the 
situation, and can, therefore, be used as an additional direct predictor of behavior (Ajzen, 2002).  
6.1.1 Relationships and beliefs. Another interesting result is the strong relationship 
between one IA and another IA tangled together on the compelling need to support each other in 
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the perceived successful execution of an operational mission. Self-efficacy beliefs affect thought 
patterns that may be self-aiding or self-hindering.  An IA behavioral intention in deciding to 
share information is influenced by the perceived success or failure of the mission; thus, another 
IA affects his attitude towards this effort as well as his mental model of the perceived outcome.  
The more strongly people believe that a certain response will lead to a certain outcome and the 
more positively they value that outcome, the stronger their intention to produce the response in 
question (Ajzen, 2012); in this case, to share information, and, in some cases, magnifying the 
violation, to execute a perceived successful operational mission.  The self-efficacy beliefs 
function as an important set of proximal determinants of human motivation, affect, and action.  
Neither IA wants to fail in meeting the organization’s goal of successful execution of an 
operational mission.  Therefore, these self-efficacy beliefs are part of their motivational, 
cognitive, and affective intervening processes in the behavioral intention, which influences the 
decision to share information.  Bandura (1989) postulates that people’s perceptions of their 
efficacy influence the types of anticipatory scenarios they construct and reiterate.  Those who 
have a high sense of efficacy visualize success scenarios that provide positive guides for 
performance.  Those who judge themselves as inefficacious are more inclined to visualize failure 
scenarios that undermine performance by dwelling on how things will go wrong. 
IA beliefs in achieving mission success over violations of security and info sharing 
policies are strongly influenced by the IA attitudes towards the policies as well as their intuition 
of success or failure.  This aligns directly as described by Bandura (1989) who argues it is widely 
believed that misjudgment produces dysfunction and gross miscalculation can create problems.  
His argument is, although optimistic self-appraisals of capability are not disparate from what is 
possible can be advantageous (mostly advantageous for the organization), veridical judgments 
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can be self-limiting.  IA assess the risks versus the benefits in their analysis before deciding to 
share or not to share information.  The most impacted in the analysis is the perceived benefit 
based on the perceived mission success.  Bandura (1989) postulates that often people err in their 
self-appraisals, and they tend to overestimate their capabilities.  This is a benefit rather than a 
cognitive failing that needs to be eradicated.  If self-efficacy beliefs always reflected only what 
people could do routinely, they would rarely fail; however, they would not mount the extra effort 
needed to surpass their ordinary performance.   IA overestimates their capabilities and the 
benefits to the success of an operational mission.  This benefit does not, and this process is so 
built into an AI belief that, for many it becomes routine; therefore, their beliefs are that they 
would rarely fail in an operational mission. Thus, many do not mount the extra effort needed to 
ensure security and info sharing policies are not violated.  Conversely, according to Bandura 
(1989), evidence suggests that it is often the so-called normals who are distorters of reality. 
However, they exhibit self-enhancing biases that distort appraisals in the positive direction 
because they take an optimistic view of their personal efficacy to exercise influence over events 
that affect their lives (Bandura, 1986, Taylor & Brown, 1988). The results support the fact that 
subjects violated laws, violated their own principles, and violated the core of the military values.  
Their subjective normal beliefs were, essentially, that they were simply doing what they were 
supposed to do in order to uphold the values of their profession and their organization’s larger 
purposes.  Unfortunately, their actions would damage their careers, but in the long term, their 
behavioral beliefs are those that led them to stand up for personal and institutional integrity.  
Daily experience tells us that the deeper satisfactions we crave come from strong bonds of 
mutual attachment to other people and larger causes outside ourselves.  Heclo (2008) argues that, 
with larger causes outside of oneself, the mirrors become windows and doors into a wider world 
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of loyalties.  He postulates that, in that world, a sense of well-being and happiness finds us rather 
than our frantically chasing it down.   
A surprising result is the weak relationship between the accuracy of data in info sharing 
and the value of the information contributed.  In the exploratory study, IA placed an enormous 
amount of emphasis on the accuracy of the data shared, but very little attention to the value of 
the information shared.  Despite the best available evidence presented to decisions-makers, there 
is always uncertainty inherent with the decisions made because it is impossible to have complete 
and perfect information that answers all questions.  With IA decisions and analysis of the risks 
and benefits, uncertainty arises from the presence of conflicting influences: security and info 
sharing policies as well as the personal (attitude and intuition) and normative beliefs.  Thus, 
making decisions in the presence of uncertainty is risky because wrong decisions could result in 
failure of the operational mission, resulting in high costs, possibly lives.  In these situations, the 
IA has the added burden of knowing that, once these decisions are executed, they cannot be 
reversed.  The rational approach would be to evaluate the accuracy of the data and its value 
(need) simultaneously for execution of the operational mission. However, during the period of 
uncertainty with the influences that affect the decision, the IA behavior places greater emphasis 
on experience and tacit knowledge, where accuracy of the data is vital to successful execution of 
the mission.  However, recent research analysis studies show that information in its various types 
has a significant effect on increasing the power of an organization (Ahituv & Carmi, 2007).  In 
other words, the IC being richer in information than its adversaries is more powerful.   This 
defining of information as an influential factor is crucial to determining the power of the IC, thus 
strengthening the importance and real value of information.  It also provides a possible 
explanation of the conflict in behavior of IA decisions.  The argument is that IA are conflicted in 
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beliefs with their focus solely on the accuracy of data and not the value of information.  
Moreover, it can provide an additional possible explanation to the influence of their decisions 
(less value placed on the security and info sharing policies) in successful or unsuccessful 
execution of operational missions.    
In info sharing, an IA contribution when sharing often influences the value of the 
information for others.  In many cases, this higher value of the information for others is 
associated with higher risks to the IC.  Each contribution possibly results in greater value, 
culminating in potentially greater risks.  While accuracy was described as vital to successful 
execution of a specific operational mission, the value of the information being shared was only 
given second thoughts in comparison, resulting in violation of the security and info sharing 
policies. In info sharing, the IA would not necessarily have complete knowledge on the risk 
tolerance for a particular operational mission, thus relying heavily on accuracy for successful 
execution without consideration of the value of the information.  This is significant because 
Messick and McClintock (1978) argued that human behavior is influenced by values that people 
assign to different action alternatives and their consequences.  Often, consequences of action 
alternatives will not only affect the actors themselves but also other people; hence, the earlier 
reference of the strong relationship between two IA.    
Table 3 shows the number of respondents mentioning components (reasons/motives) for 
sharing information.  Another very interesting empirical finding of this research study is the lack 
of adherence to security and info sharing policies as it relates to the perceived usefulness of the 
policies in allowing successful execution of operational missions. The “execution of a successful 
mission” and “mission first, fix policy later to adjust to meet mission needs” reasons stood out 
significantly as large contributors (16 out of 18 on each) to the lack of adherence to security and 
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info sharing policies.  IA work in environments where sharing of information must be protected 
at all levels to prevent loss of operational capabilities and to keep a competitive advantage over 
adversaries in mission execution.  It also allows IA the ability to make better decisions when 
pieces of information are shared collectivity across the IC.  The results found that most IA 
viewed the policies as constraining or inhibiting towards accomplishing the missions and in most 
of the scenarios actually violated the security and info sharing policies.  In addition, when IA 
beliefs were strong influences, it affected their decision to share information forcing possible 
non-compliance with the oath of office or enlistment to include UCMJ authorities.  This research 
study empirically found that the lack of adherence to the security and info sharing is contrary to 
what is understood in the IC and could shed light on this veil used by the IC that most IA 
described as inhibitors or roadblocks in their analysis when considering the risks and benefits to 
info sharing in deciding to share or not share information.  As mentioned, the info sharing goals 
as explained in ICD 501 are to: 1) foster an enduring culture of responsible sharing and 
collaboration with an integrated IC; 2) provide an improved capacity to warn of and disrupt 
threats to the U.S. homeland, and U.S. persons and interests; and 3) provide more accurate, 
timely, and insightful analysis to inform decision-making by the president, senior military 
commanders, national security advisers, and other executive branch officials were the focus of 
most IA when deciding to share info, but contradicted other factors, specifically security policies, 
when focusing on successfully executing the operational mission.   
Info sharing has become critical due to the U.S. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act creating an Info-Sharing Environment fused by the ICD to foster a culture of 
more sharing within inter-/intra-agency organization environments with pressures from 
organization factors, such as, security and info sharing policies. Controlling of info sharing by 
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solely focusing on the security and info sharing policies without the increasing demand for the 
need of info sharing coupled with ever-changing Intel operational mission environments forces 
IA to share info where the risks may outweigh the benefits.  Due to these risks, amendments to 
existing policies should be evaluated continuously.  IA in their decisions to share or not share 
information are faced with rapidly changing operational environments of available information 
being shared, coalition collaboration, and changes in the classes of information shared, all of 
which are evaluated by them in risk and benefit analysis influenced by their behavior.  General 
or static policies are inhibitors and require continuous monitoring with additions and deletions to 
the rules to meet the changes in the environment that IA are faced with every day in the 
operational environments.  In the IC today, it takes months to change a security policy with 
months of delays between the changes to be effective to the IA.  What is needed is a capability 
that enables dynamic switching between policies within minutes, without introducing new risks 
or vulnerabilities, through a system that provides dynamic authoring, selection, and deployment 
of security and info sharing-related policies and also allows IA to fully execute the operational 
mission without risks and fully engage in the IC objective of inter-/intra-agency info sharing.  
When  security and info sharing policies are perceived as useful to IA, they will be applied 
effectively in a risks-versus-benefits analysis and will influence their decision-making positively 
in executing Intel operational missions.   
  
 
 
83 
CONTRIBUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
7.1  Contributions 
This research makes five valuable contributions; to wit, it:  1) describes the paradox of 
the info sharing decision of an IA analysis of the benefits and risks influenced by the 
organization’s security and info sharing policies and an individual’s behavior intention; 2) 
explains the decision-making behavior of people’s willingness to share information with others, 
even when the risks may outweigh the benefits (to better understand how we might go about 
modifying behavior in a desirable direction); 3) demonstrates how TPB may be used as an 
analytical framework that describes how past behavior of users’ decisions to share information 
with others in the IC; 4) develops a conceptual framework to evaluate adherence to info sharing 
decision-making in the IC; and 5) provides practical guidance for improving IA decision-making 
in the presence of the paradox. 
First, the findings of this research study empirically demonstrate the paradox of the info 
sharing decision of an IA analysis of the benefits and risks influenced by the organization’s 
security and info sharing policies and an individual’s behavior intention. In describing the 
paradox of the info sharing decision of IA analysis of the benefits and risks influenced by the 
organization’s security and info sharing policies and an individual’s behavior intention, it begins 
with understanding the behavior intention of IA.  The decisions made within the paradox of info 
sharing are not necessarily made in a rational fashion.  A large body of empirical research attests 
to the predictive validity of the TPB. Various techniques have been developed to increase 
behavioral control, although these techniques have not been used in a TPB context.  Some 
methods focus on imbuing individuals with a sense of self-efficacy or perception of behavioral 
control.  These methods can thus influence behavioral intentions; that is, the motivation to 
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engage in the behavior, but they may also provide valuable information about actual behavioral 
performance. 
The behavior intentions of IA begin with the extent to which they possess an accurate 
understanding of their own mental processes as well as their understanding of the security and 
info sharing policies.  The behavior intention is based on how good their insight into how they 
actually weigh evidence is in making judgments for each situation to be analyzed.  In each 
situation, they have a mental model consisting of beliefs and assumptions as to which variables 
are most important and how the variables are related to each other.  This research empirically 
found how the paradox in navigating the benefits and risks in info sharing is strongly influenced 
by IA beliefs, specifically their attitudes and intention, most important, their background beliefs, 
like the religious belief.  This supports TPB, specifically the extended research on background 
factors conducted by Ouellette and Wood (1998).  They postulated that, “in domains that 
facilitated development and execution of habits, past behavior was a strong predictor and 
intention relatively weak.  In domains that did not facilitate habits, past behavior was a relatively 
weak direct predictor and intention was quite strong” (Ouellette and Wood, 1998, p. 66).   
Since IA actions are typically triggered by environmental events, activities are not 
necessarily repetitive in nature and require great attention to detail. This research found that for 
subjects with more experience and more analytical skill, in most cases, past behavior was 
relatively weak and direct predictor and intention was strong; however, for the subjects that were 
less skilled, past behavior was a strong predictor and intention relatively weak. This research 
points out an exception in the research findings described by Ouellette and Wood (1998), 
although it validates the extended portion of TPB.  This research found that, in either situation, 
certain factors can play a strong predicator whether habitual behavior or not, even where 
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intention may be quite strong.  In this research study, the past behavior was a strong predictor 
and intention was strong despite the IA experience or skill level where the background factor 
was significantly influenced by a personal belief, such as a religious belief or the value the IA 
may place on the life of another.  
Second, this research also explains the decision-making behavior of people’s willingness 
to share information with others, even when the risks may outweigh the benefits.  The empirical 
findings demonstrated subjects are willing to risk sharing information with others, even when the 
risks may outweigh the benefits, when the IA perceives that the sharing results in successful 
execution of an operational mission.  To this end, subjects accepted the risks or misinterpreted 
the security and info sharing policies when they believed it was not to their advantage in 
accomplishing the perceived organization’s primary goal, successful execution the operational 
mission. To affect the decision influenced by security and info sharing policies as well as 
behavior factors, such as attitude, intuition, and personal beliefs there must be behavior change 
interventions.    Behavior change interventions must accomplish two major objectives:  They 
must motivate individuals to perform the behavior, and once this has been accomplished, they 
must ensure that the behavior will be carried out.   
There are two approaches to the behavioral change intervention.  One approach involves 
intervention based on TPB, which focuses on targeting behavioral, normative, and control beliefs 
in an effort to produce positive intentions among the IA, who, prior to the intervention, either did 
not contemplate performing the behavior or were disinclined to do so.  In other cases, inducing 
favorable intentions may not be enough to produce a change in the target behavior.  First, the 
implementation stage for changing the behavioral change of IA is to focus on control issues, 
dealing with internal and external factors that can facilitate or inhibit performance of the 
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intended behavior. The empirical research study demonstrated focus should be on the 
information security and info sharing policies, which subjects felt inhibited their ability to 
accomplish the mission.  IA cannot be exposed to all possible scenarios of operational mission 
events.  This research study proves that introducing theoretic scenario-based operational mission 
events that are designed to challenge unfavorable beliefs (religious or personal) resulting in the 
consequences of violating the security and info sharing policies is a much greater risk to the IC 
than actual successful execution or even perceived accomplishment of the ongoing mission.  IA 
believe that every piece of information that is shared contributes to successful execution of an 
operational mission.  What happens when the mission is not successful?  Unfortunately, the 
focus and control of the belief are weighted heavily on the perceived successful execution and 
not those that would result in an unsuccessful execution.  The change in focus would move 
towards the needed behavioral change.  IA should be exposed to scenario-based operational 
mission events with emphasis on perceived unsuccessful executions to force a behavioral 
change.  This behavioral change would heighten the senses of IA focus on the benefits of using 
the security and info sharing policies as successful applications versus inhibitors to operational 
missions.   Another approach is to use role models (senior officials) identified in stories of 
scenario-based operational mission events designed to influence behavioral, normative, and 
control beliefs.  The interventions that balance the successful and unsuccessful will be quite 
effective, producing changes in beliefs that will be reflected in the intended and actual decisions 
of IA when sharing information.  There should be less focus on the fact that shared information 
absolutely results in successful execution of an operational mission and more focus on the the 
fact that shared information only contributes to possible successful execution of an operational 
mission.  A change in the behavior requires a change in the inherent belief of many IA that 
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shared information leads to successful execution of an operational mission; unsuccessful 
execution in operational missions is not part of the attitude of IA.   
 The third contribution of this research study is the adaptation of TPB as an analytical 
framework that describes how past behavior of users influences decisions to share information 
with others in the IC.  Some researchers (McClintock, 1978; Messick & McClintock, 1968) 
posited that human behavior is influenced by values that people assign to different action 
alternatives and their consequences. What is the behavior that influences an IA to share classified 
material with others not authorized?  In this research study, the behavior that influences an IA to 
share classified material with others not authorized was mostly influence by the organization’s 
desired goal of absolute perceived execution of operational mission success.  Could IA behavior 
have been influenced by values unconsciously inherited from being a member of the IC, 
practicing the mandated security and info sharing policies? In the research study, IA values were 
unconsciously inherited from the relationship of others within the IC, which felt inhibited by the 
security and info sharing policies when driving towards the unit’s overall goal.  In some 
instances, another IA as social peer, impacted the IA decisions and actions resulting in perceived 
success influenced the info sharing decision.  In TPB, the most detailed substantive information 
about the determinants of a behavior is contained in a person’s behavioral, normative, and 
control beliefs.  What are the most influential behavioral factors in the decision-making of IA 
when sharing information with others? In this research study, the most influential behavioral 
factors were attitude, intuition and personal beliefs that changed IA behavioral intention.   This 
supports TPB, which posits there are differences in the decision-making when an IA believes the 
recipient has authorization versus no authorization. (Allport, 1935, 1968) pointed out that the 
concept of attitude “is probably the most distinctive and indispensable concept in contemporary 
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American social psychology” (1968, p. 59).  With this understanding, often, consequences of 
action alternatives will not only affect the actors themselves but also others; most important, the 
IC.  In the adaptation of TPB, these values include an actor’s background factors (social, 
personal, information) and beliefs (behavior, normal, control).   
The background and beliefs of an individual represent a behavior intention, as well as a 
stable preference for distribution outcomes (inadvertent, desired, or intentional) between one’s 
own self and the organization.  The background factors (See Appendix A) and individual beliefs 
are extremely important influencing factors in the conflict between the behavior of IA and the 
organization’s security and info sharing policies in the paradox of info sharing.  Do IA consider 
their own benefits and risks in sharing information but also the benefits and risks to the 
organization?  Will they contribute more information of high value than information of low 
value?  The logical answer is, the IA may very well, in their decision to share information, 
consider the benefits and risks to others.  This could result in contributing more information of 
value or higher classification that benefits an IA during a successful mission, but violates the 
organization’s security and info sharing polices to do so.  On the other hand, it may be consistent 
with the organization’s security and info sharing policies, resulting in sharing information of less 
value or lower classification, but also in an unsuccessful mission. 
In some cases, inducing favorable intentions may not be enough to produce a change in 
the target behavior.  In these instances, two interventions may be required; one to produce the 
desired intention and another very different intervention to facilitate performance of the intended 
behavior.  When asked to explain why they failed to act on their intentions, people often say that 
they forgot or it slipped their minds (Orbell, Hodgkinson, & Sheeran 1997; Sheeran & Orbell 
1999).   To close the gap, the focus must be on implementation intention.  The approach is to ask 
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IA when, where, and how they will carry out their intentions, important for less and highly 
skilled analysts, increasing the likelihood that they will so.  The focus should be on situations 
that violate security and info sharing policies and that inhibit operational missions.  These will 
allow control of the behaviors and facilitate in practicing in environments where success is  
measured differently and total focus is not only on successful execution of the mission, but also 
on successful execution of compliance with security and info sharing policies.    
Lack of adequate control over the behavior can make it difficult or impossible to perform 
an intended behavior.  Internal factors, such as lack of sufficient willpower and perseverance or 
lack of requisite skills and resources or external factors, like cooperation from another person, 
can interfere with planned behavior.  Additional methods can be developed to increase 
behavioral control that focus on instilling individuals with a sense of self-efficacy or perception 
of behavioral control.  The methods would influence behavioral intention, which is the 
motivation to engage in the behavior, while also providing valuable information about actual 
behavioral performance.  Observational learning, modeling techniques and mental simulation, all 
of which are the premises of the theoretic scenario-based operational missions in this research 
study, provide valuable information about actual behavioral performance.   Successive 
approximation and simulation of the desired behavior are other methods that are designed to 
provide individuals with the tools and other resources needed to overcome potential hurdles and 
gain actual control over behavior performance. 
The fourth contribution of this research study is the development of a conceptual 
framework to evaluate adherence to info sharing decision-making in the IC.  Within the 
conceptual framework of this research study, the IA’s benefits and risks analysis are moderated 
by organizational factors (security and info sharing policies) and behavioral intentions (attitude, 
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values, and intuition), which influence info sharing decisions that result in desirable or 
undesirable outcomes. As empirically found in this research study, past behavior influenced IA 
decisions during info sharing.  This past behavior influencing factor was also empirically proven 
in Kidwell and Jewell’s (2008) research study were the influencing factors where considered a 
critical part of the decision making process.  Therefore, this research study further suggests that 
the past behavior, such as, intuitions and personal beliefs, are influencing factors on the 
intentions of the decision maker.   
Gibbsons et al. (2003) developed the Prototype-Willingness Model (PWM) based on 
three assumptions about risky behaviors among adolescents and young adults.  Gibbsons et al. 
(2003) posited risky behavior is neither reasoned nor intentional, which led to additional 
constructs of TPB with the predictors of behavioral expectations and behavioral willingness. 
IA access to information processing is approved based on security clearance level, need 
to know, and system access to the appropriate classification levels of the information.  Generally, 
an IA has access to data at three classification levels: Unclassified, Secret, and Top Secret.  
Although there are other compartmented classifications within each of the general levels of 
access, the focus of this research study is on the access to information at these three general 
levels.  It is important to understand how an IA attempts to process information since it is part of 
his/her internal process to decision-making.  According to Neisser (1967), most people operate in 
a perception-action cycle, suggesting that the senses take in information from the environment, 
the mid brain performs computations on that information and the outputs of those computations 
are used to guide subsequent goad-directed actions.  However, Newell and Broder (2008) argue 
that, since most people’s information capacity is limited, he/she must use cognitive models to 
propose heuristics or shortcuts. 
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The organization’s security and info sharing policies have increased in complexity when 
sharing across an intra-/inter-agency.  First, it changes rapidly with the increasing need for intra-
/inter-agency sharing of information.  There are partnerships that form and disband based on an 
organization’s interest and mission execution. At any moment, a partnership must be formed 
under the conditions that info sharing is necessary based on a new agreement between the U.S. 
and a national partner because of the relationship in a particular environment that is later 
disbanded under the conditions that the partner now puts the organization at risk.  The 
organization’s need for sharing information often changes and is often unclear at different levels 
within the organization or across inter-/intra-agencies.  At various levels, organizations have 
strict policies to sharing information, but they are created generically at very high levels and 
execution is done at much lower levels and could very well be left to different interpretations by 
individuals that could put the organization at risk.  These types of conditions intensify when 
considering how IA seek information to share. 
Given the need for the increase in info sharing across intra-/inter-agency organizations 
and the importance of the benefits and risks associated with sharing information, understanding 
the how and why provides insights into behaviors of IA decision-making.  Moreover, previous 
studies reveal that computer supported info sharing plays an increasing role in a multitude of 
situations, such as organizational knowledge management, online collaboration, and decision-
making.  Since info sharing does not always flow as smoothly as expected and the decision to 
share is impacted by various factors, it is important for inter-/intra-agency organizations to 
understand the behavior of IA.  Specifically, attitude and intuition, which influence the 
willingness or non-willingness of the IA decision to share information released inadvertently or 
intentionally that may violate security and info sharing policies and put the IC at greater risk; 
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and, thereby, possibly put the nation at risk.  Developing more effective decision-making, 
however, requires organizations to fully understand not only how these intended decisions and 
past behaviors are developed in theory, but also how they are developed in practice.  This study 
provides further insights into this process and the interactions that influence the decision while 
exploring the behavior of IA.  This study also illuminates the mechanisms by which information 
behavior was propagated. These mechanisms include the use of mediators (attitude and intuition) 
which was perceived as one part of the paradox in the decision-making for IAs and was, 
therefore, propagated and legitimated in narratives.  Hence, because intuition was perceived as 
an influenced mediator, it was perpetuated as a social norm in the perceived behavioral control of 
the TPB model.  This occurred despite the conflict with the security and info sharing policies, the 
other part of the paradox, in the conceptual model.    
By a close examination of the info sharing decision-making of IA using the theoretic 
operational mission based scenarios, this research provided revelations of the behaviors and 
behavior intentions through which IA info sharing decisions flow.  Although one cannot 
generalize from these only, by exploring the analysis within each scenario and comparing across 
each of them, this provides approaches to understanding info sharing decision-making within 
organizations and the conflicts that exist.  Background factors (past behavior) in general are 
understood as actions or reactions of a person in response to external or internal stimuli in the 
past. These factors include general attitudes, personality traits, values, emotions, intelligence, 
age, gender, race, ethnicity, education, religion, experience, knowledge, and media exposure.  As 
such, specific interest in this research is in the relationship between past behavior and intention 
under special circumstances of IA experience or habits.  Moreover, understanding behavioral 
intentions using past behaviors that lead to decision-making, specifically the role of past 
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behavior as predictor of intention, recently has had a considerable amount of attention in the 
literature, but is also criticized based on the relevance of past behavior being an extra predictor.  
Therefore, this study offers a further contribution in showing the value of applying past behavior 
and developing TPB as a framework for studying developing info sharing decision-making in 
inter-/intra-agency organizations.     
Finally, the fifth contribution of this research study is to provide practical guidance for 
improving IA decision-making in the presence of the paradox.  Most security policies address 
some form of vulnerability management.  IT security professionals depend upon accurate 
assessments to determine whether intervention is necessary and implement proper steps for 
mitigation or remediation.  There is no problem obtaining the data.  Most security devices and 
scanners generate terabytes of data for analysis.  The challenge is interpreting the data, 
specifically, identifying those specific vulnerabilities that truly represent a clear and present risk 
to intelligence information.  IA need solutions that help them distinguish the danger signals from 
the noise that allows them to follow through with actions.  For example, a mission-critical Web 
Server may have several known vulnerabilities, but which of those present a genuine risk and 
require analysis of the benefits and risks.  For an IA  Senior to be successful, vulnerability 
management solutions should identify and dismiss certain attacks as “noise” and flag the others 
as “signals” that require immediate attention that allows the IA to share information without 
background factor influences weighing heavily on their decisions 
Compliance is another challenge with the perception that attaining compliance reduces 
risk to acceptable levels.  For example, the Payment Card Industry Data Security Standards, 
(PCI-DSS), Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), North American 
Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) standards, 
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Federal Information Security Mandate Act (FISMA) and National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) standards all drive organizations to adopt security risk management 
approaches, but compliance guidelines and standards alone doesn’t necessarily equate to 
successful info sharing.  To achieve effective risk management in sharing information, IA must 
abandon the limitations and expenses of traditional, reactive approaches in favor of objective 
learning combined with the understanding of proactive security, data-driven investment models.   
In addition, they must overcome several challenges: analysis and interpreting massive amounts 
of data, monitoring dynamic assets, incorporating both compliance and security into best 
practices, moving beyond the traditional rational decision-making as well as the utilizing the 
standard “scan-and-patch” approaches to implement security best practice programs, and trusting 
conventional prioritization methods beyond their scope.  Unfortunately, IA rely on rational 
decisions and the IC enterprise trust that “scan-and-patch” methods for security.  However, 
training IA in methods based on rational choice coupled with security patching that inherently 
keeps cybercriminals or hackers ahead inhibits info sharing and greater allows for influence of 
background factors to affect the decision in info sharing. The focus cannot be solely on security 
patching, although an important step, IA need a variety of proactive solutions, like the objective 
learning, theoretical models and simulations combined with implementation of the security and 
info sharing practices in the IC. 
7.2  Limitations 
With any research, there are always anticipated limitations that may offer opportunities 
for future studies.  First, since this research involves only three scenarios, there is a problem with 
the generalizability of the research from sample to population.  Second, this study is limited to 
one intra-agency organization, the IC, including the military services, that varies greatly in their 
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operational missions, is decentralized in their decision-making, and is engaged in protecting the 
national defense of the United States.  As such, changes in the findings may occur in studies 
involving public organizations or differ from these inter-/intra-agencies in size, location, degree 
of decentralization, mission, environment, and organizational structure.  Third, interviews based 
upon past events may be biased, events may be filtered out that do not fit, or certain views could 
be censored, even though the researcher will make an effort to mitigate any biases through 
triangulation and verification using multiple data sources.  Finally, past behavior must be 
examined to determine if further functions may be relevant and other factors may exist, the 
inclusion of which could improve explained variance of intention, which should be analyzed 
over time.  
7.2.1 Generalizability.  Firestone (1993) suggests three levels of generalization: sample 
to population; analytic, which is theory connected; and case-to-case research.  With only three 
cases, this research will not be generalizable from sample to population, but will have analytic 
and case-to-case generalizability. The choice of the scenarios in this particular research study is 
based upon conceptual grounds not on representative ground.  The research used multiple-case 
sampling and cross-case comparison in following replication strategy to identify repeating 
patterns (Miles & Huberman, 1994b; Yin, 2009).  This cross-case comparison is made possible 
in that the selected scenarios are in similar settings, involve a coherent sampling frame, and 
focus on similar processes.  According to Mason (2002), the limited sample to population 
generalizability of case study research should be balanced against advantages of its attention to 
context dynamics, and multiple participants perspective.  In addition, Lincoln and Guba (1985) 
suggest audit procedures that will help other researchers to assess the findings in their 
transferability to other contexts.  To ensure rigor, the study triangulated between different data 
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sources, checking against public data and internal communications, multiple interviewees, 
feedback from key participants, and field observations (Miles & Huberman, 1994b; Yin, 2009, p. 
267).  
7.2.2 Variance.  An additional limitation in this research study is that a majority of the 
subjects actually shared information during their analysis of the theoretic operational based 
scenarios, resulting in actual violation of security and info sharing policies or in non-compliance 
with their oath of office or enlistment, potentially being in violation of the UCMJ.  This is an 
issue with the research results producing insufficient variance in results to enable one to 
distinguish between the reasons for adherence to the security and info sharing policies when 
compared to reasons not to adhere to the security and info sharing policies.  It would be 
interesting for future research to investigate the functionality of the security and info sharing 
policies in a way that better captures explanations that focus specifically in the area of adhering 
to the security and info sharing policies.  
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CONCLUSION 
The aim of this exploratory study was to examine the behavior of IA and to investigate 
the paradox of info sharing in the IC.  Why do people share information with others; primarily 
what influences the individual’s decision that drives him/her to violate security and info sharing 
policies?  The understanding of IA behaviors allows a better understanding of how one might go 
about modifying behavior in a desirable direction.   The results provide support that background 
factors do influence the beliefs people hold.  These factors (attitudes and intuition) and broad life 
values influence intentions, and, thus, an IA decision in info sharing. Hodgkinson, Salder-Smith, 
Burke, Claston, and Sparrow (2009a, p. 277) noted that until recently, only the “bravest and most 
far-sighted” would recognized the utility of intuition in management decision-making.   
Why did IA actually violate security and info sharing policies so easily?  There is a major 
external influence on IA in accomplishing the organization’s goal of mission success.  IA 
construct their own version of reality based on information provided by the senses.  IA beliefs in 
their capabilities affect how much stress and depression they experience in threatening or taxing 
situations, as well as their level of motivation.  Such emotional reactions can influence behaviors 
both directly and indirectly by altering their decision to share information and the course of 
actions they choose. IA who believe they can exercise control (perceived behavioral control) 
over beliefs do not conjure up apprehensive cognitions; in other words, they saw no conflict in 
their decisions when balancing them against the administrative security and info sharing policies; 
therefore, they are not perturbed by them.  However, anxiety arose when their beliefs conflicted 
with organizational goals or personal values (attitudes and intuition) and they often 
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overestimated their decision when balanced against the core values of the military and the 
security and info sharing policies.  
Part of ensuring the overall reliability of adherence to security and info sharing policies 
requires changes in the operation of how we develop and revise new policies, as well as, 
reviewing the processes on how these policies are understood and implemented.  To implement 
the appropriate mechanisms for enforcing those policies, requires policy bundles that will 
contain a variety of components conducive to ever-changing environments in the execution of 
Intel operational mission.  In addition, the policies must be adaptive to security enforcement of 
rapid deployment and within minutes without introducing new risk or vulnerabilities through a 
system that allows for dynamic authoring, selection, and deployment of security and info sharing 
related policies.  Another approach to ensure adherence to the security and info sharing policies 
is to implement case-based training to facilitate IA understanding of importance of the policies 
that aid in their accomplishing Intel operational mission.  In addition, behavior change 
intervention may be required.  To do this, it must accomplish two objectives:  motivate the IA to 
perform a different behavior, and, once this has been accomplished, it must ensure that the 
behavior be carried out.  Focusing on the control issues, dealing with internal and external 
factors that can facilitate or inhibit performance of the intended behavior—in other words, 
mission first and always—are factors that will always drive an IA to think the mission is above 
the law. Intervention studies have shown that changing people’s behavioral, normative, and 
control beliefs influences their intentions and actions.   
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A:  Theory of Planned Behavior and Information Sharing 
Paradox Constructs 
  
Background  
Factors 
Past behavior beliefs that are actions or reactions of a person in 
response to external or internal stimuli in the past; relational 
properties are general attitudes, personality traits, values, 
emotions, intelligence, age, gender, race, ethnicity, education, 
religion, experience, knowledge, and media exposure; specific 
interest in this research study is relationship between past behavior 
and intention under special circumstances of Intelligence 
Operators experience/habits (risky behavior) 
Behavior  
Beliefs 
Beliefs about the likely outcomes of the behavior and the 
evaluation of these outcomes; produces a favorable or unfavorable 
attitude toward the behavior 
Normal 
Beliefs 
Beliefs about the normative expectations and actions of important 
referents and motivation to comply with these referents; results in 
perceived social pressure or a subjective norm 
Control 
Beliefs 
Beliefs about the presence of factors that may facilitate or impede 
performance of the behavior and the perceived power of these 
factors; gives rise to perceived behavioral control 
Behavior  
Intentions 
With the combination of attitude toward the behavior (behavior 
beliefs), subjective norm (normal beliefs), and perception of 
behavioral control (control beliefs) leads to the formation of a 
behavioral intention 
Intelligence  
Analyst 
Access 
Independent variable and the unit of analysis identified as the who 
or what and is described and analyzed in this research study; 
relational proprieties are tacit knowledge, individual interests, 
values, emotions, intuition, attitudes, media exposure, age, gender, 
ethnicity, race, and religion  
Risks To 
Be Taken 
Dependent variable describing the level of risk to be taken under 
consideration by the (independent variable) Intelligence Operator 
moderated by the value of information and power behind 
information as well as moderated by the policies and directives of 
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the organization; organizational portfolio conditions (independent 
variable) competes with the Intelligence Operator in determining 
the amount of risk under consideration for sharing information 
Information 
Sharing Decision 
The results of the risk to be taken decision by the Intelligence 
Operator is mediated by cost-benefit analysis and Intelligence 
Operators behavior biases; behavior biases are moderated by 
behavioral intentions 
Type of 
Outcome 
Dependent variable that reflects positive or negative information 
sharing decisions made by Intelligence Operators moderated by 
the cost-benefit analysis of Intelligence Operators and their 
behavior biases 
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Appendix B:  Interview Guide 
 
 
DESCRIPTION 
1. What was your first instinct behind the analysis of your decisions? 
 
2. How would you characterize your decision?  
a) Positively 
b) Negatively 
3. How do you believe the organization would characterize your decision?  
a) Positively 
b) Negatively 
4. Do you believe your decision in this scenario aligns with the organization’s security 
and information sharing policy? 
 
5. Does it make a difference what people you are interacting with when deciding to 
share information? 
 
6. Which is more important to you?  (Please explain your response.) 
a) Ensuring accurate data is shared for mission accomplishment? 
b) Understanding the value of the information being shared? 
7. If you identify negative actions (incidents) in sharing information that result in a 
desired outcome for the organization or Intelligence Community accomplishing the 
mission  
a) What actions do you take? 
b) How do you react? 
 
8. If you identify positive actions in sharing information that results in an undesirable 
outcome for the organization or Intelligence Community 
a) What actions do you take? 
b) How do you react? 
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